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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On April 5, 2009, in the crowded Hradcany Square of Prague, U.S. President 
Barack Obama delivered the most compelling speech on nuclear weapons in the last 
decade. He described the nuclear arsenal’s Cold War legacy, the U.S. role as a leading 
nuclear power, and the two main U.S. commitments for the future. The first commitment 
was the aim to reach nuclear zero:  
“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security 
of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly 
– perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must 
ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we 
can’.”1 
As leader of the only country in history to ever use nuclear weapons, and successor in a 
line of presidents who very clearly voiced a pro-nuclear stance, Obama made a 
monumental declaration. He then followed the statement with a backtracking effort to 
prevent diplomatic panic: 
“Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, 
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our 
allies – including the Czech Republic.”2 
The U.S. has promised to defend allies all over the world with nuclear forces, and 
consequently has been forced into a delicate and precarious position. Obama wants to 
reach nuclear zero, which would make the world safe from nuclear destruction in the 
future; yet he also wants to provide security for allied nations in the present, using the 
very weapons he has marked for destruction. There are also potential problems of “rogue” 
nuclear states that are unbound by any international treaty, non-state actors bent on 
                                                
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama as Delivered,” The White House, April 5, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered. 
2 Ibid. 
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nuclear terrorism, and the extremely difficult and essentially impossible task of 
convincing the other nuclear states to simultaneously disarm. 
 In the midst of this debate is the U.S capacity to efficiently maintain and replace 
the existing numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Amy Woolf, a Specialist 
in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Service, states that during the 
New START ratification process in 2010, the Obama Administration submitted a budget 
of $210 billion, over a ten-year period from 2011 to 2021, in order to “maintain and 
modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal”.3 The Administration supports a comprehensive 
nuclear triad, and so does newly instated Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, though 
both face difficult choices as conventional capacity updates take precedent over nuclear 
ones and modernization plans look more and more implausible to fund.4 After all, an 
investigation by the Congressional Budget Office in 2013 discovered that due to 
complications of funding allocation between the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Energy, as well as an omission of spending estimates for procuring future 
generations of weapons and delivery systems, the budget would be closer to $355 billion 
from 2011 to 2021.5 Some have argued that the nuclear triad is no longer necessary, 
proposing alternative plans that eliminate one or two of the legs, while others call for 
complete nuclear disarmament so the U.S. can set the precedent toward global nuclear 
zero.6 In short, the U.S. is debating three major aspects of its nuclear triad: the physical 
                                                
3 Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” Congressional 
Research Service, March 18, 2015, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf. 
4 Jeffrey Lewis, “The Nuclear Trials of Ashton Carter,” Foreign Policy, February 5, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/05/nuclear-triad-modernization-strategic-defense-ashton-carter-
pentagon/. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The nuclear triad is composed of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers, and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  
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totals of nuclear warheads and missiles; the proportions of its arsenal dedicated each leg 
of the nuclear triad; and the overall cost it will take to complete modernization proposals. 
 With these circumstances in mind, how exactly does the U.S. create the minimal 
“safe, secure, and effective [nuclear] arsenal”, which will intimidate all foes and protect 
all allies? How well does the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal meet its foreign security 
commitments? What triggers allies to respond to changes in U.S. nuclear policy? And 
how well does the U.S. adapt its nuclear strategy to each allied country’s unique 
geographical, political and cultural circumstances? 
 This paper connects these questions specifically to the U.S. security relationship 
with Japan. While not as volatile as regions like the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the 
East Asian region is full of its own unique tensions. Japan, one of America’s most 
significant allies in that part of the world, is surrounded by potentially harmful nuclear 
states, including China and North Korea. It has considered the potential to nuclearize in 
the past, and it employs nuclear energy as a source of power. In lieu of Obama’s mission 
toward nonproliferation and an eventual nuclear zero, it is essential that countries like 
Japan are protected so they do not feel threatened enough to attain nuclear weapons of 
their own. But how much do U.S. nuclear weapons really play a role in these security 
commitments? Are they effective in strengthening the alliances? And if the role of 
nuclear weapons is to be reduced in future U.S. nuclear policy, how will it affect the 
response and interests of the alliance itself? 
 Chapter 1 will explain the concept of extended nuclear deterrence in the context 
of the U.S., from the evolution of the first atomic bomb in the 1940s to the current arsenal. 
This will relate to the specific factors influencing the decision to extend U.S. nuclear 
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deterrence beyond its own borders, as well as the major changes in the structure of the 
force over the past century, and the most up to date status of the arsenal and its missile 
systems.  
Chapter 2 will discuss the initial U.S.-Japan security arrangement and the major 
historical influences that have shaped the two countries’ relationship through modern 
times. Emphasis will be placed on how the initial interests of both states manifested 
themselves through nuclear security policy, from the development of the 1947 Japanese 
Constitution to the establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, on which the bilateral relationship is based. 
Chapter 3 will examine three specific time periods in which the U.S.-Japan 
security relationship experienced particularly heightened levels of tensions and 
uncertainty with relation to the U.S. nuclear arsenal, in order to determine what types of 
challenges the alliance faced and to assess the reactions of both parties in response to 
these challenges. The analysis covers the circumstances surrounding the 1960s Chinese 
nuclear tests; the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine under the supervision of 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; and the rise of the North Korean nuclear program in 
the 1990s. All three of these sections will provide essential background as the focus of 
the paper turns to modern day and the important changes that are occurring within the 
Japanese and U.S. security paradigms.  
Chapter 4 brings these historical background events into context with the present, 
in order to understand how well the nuclear relationship between Japan and the U.S. is 
faring today. Current negotiations and diplomatic strategies will be evaluated within the 
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limits of the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal and posture, as well as the security-related 
concerns held by both nations. 
Chapter 5 will transition to the future plans for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, keeping 
in mind the New START Treaty reductions, the changing security environment, and the 
nuclear modernization proposals being discussed in Washington. Understanding these 
changes is a requirement for determining how effectively the U.S. nuclear arsenal will 
fulfill its security commitments with Japan. Given the historical and modern factors that 
contribute to the development or regression of alliances, will there be more or fewer 
bilateral crises in the future? Are there still triggers, such as those from previous periods 
of tension, which could complicate the bilateral relationship?  
With this paper, the author hopes to contribute a work of practicality and depth on 
U.S.-Japan relations to further understanding of the stakes involved in nuclear deterrence, 
not just for the U.S. protection of its own borders, but also for the protection of countries 
around the world. South Korea and other major allies are also dependent on the 
protection of U.S. nuclear weapons, and therefore pertain just as strongly to U.S. interests 
and strategy throughout the process of modernizing and shifting the nuclear arsenal. 
Discussing nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War age is still highly relevant, as these 
weapons will be maintained in the arsenal, the budget, and the diplomatic relations of the 
U.S., and make up an aspect of national security that has become a priority item in recent 
U.S. policy discussions. 
Definition of Deterrence 
 Deterrence is a term best understood when compared with defense, and can be 
clearly illustrated through a Tolkienian lens. When Rohan is threatened by Saruman’s 
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Uruk-hai, King Theodred of the horse nation moves his people to the fortified Helm’s 
Deep, prepares his armies as best he can, and settles down to wait for the enemy to attack. 
This is a defense strategy, because it is designed to repel the enemy once the attack 
commences. On the other hand, in the hypothetical situation that Smaug the dragon were 
still alive, in Rohan, and sworn to destroy all enemies of the horse nation, Theodred and 
his people could have stayed where they were and convincingly threatened the Uruk-hai 
that if they attacked, they would face fiery retribution, enough to wipe out the entire 
Uruk-hai population. This move would force the enemy to forfeit the attack entirely, 
exemplifying the strategy of deterrence. Schelling postulates that while defense strategy 
is mainly concerned with an enemy’s physical strength, deterrence, or “the coercive use 
of the power to hurt,” relies more heavily on an assessment of an enemy’s “wants or 
fears,” in other words, enemy interests.7 This does not mean that deterrence entirely 
neglects the opponent’s physical capabilities; rather, it strives to find targets that would 
cause the enemy so much suffering that the thought of it overpowers the possible launch 
of a physical offensive. Both defense and deterrence are aspects of U.S. joint security 
policy with Japan, but this paper will look specifically at deterrence for protecting Japan 
from external threats. Nuclear weapons, like Smaug the dragon, prioritize the prevention 
of attacks by giving potential foes compelling reasons not to attack. 
Literature on Deterrence and the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons 
The field of deterrence theory is complex and, at times, even contradictory. This 
section will briefly discuss pertinent academic assumptions about the requirements for 
successful deterrence, and the uniqueness of nuclear deterrence compared to conventional 
deterrence. 
                                                
7 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 3. 
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Waltz outlines three specific parameters for the physical requirements of 
deterrence. The first is that “a part of the force must appear to be able to survive an attack 
and launch one of its own.”8 The second is that “survival of the force must not require 
early firing in response to what may be false alarms.”9 Proponents of the full nuclear triad 
argue that only with a stable system of nuclear submarines, bombers, and ICBMs can the 
U.S. resist the temptation to “prompt launch,” a term describing the early firing of 
nuclear weapons in response to potential false alarms. Waltz’s final parameter is similar 
to the second in that “weapons must not be susceptible to accidental and unauthorized 
use.”10 This requires a strong showing by the deterring country to demonstrate that its 
nuclear weapons are being kept at the highest level of monitoring and care. The U.S. 
failed this principle in August 2007, when Air Force workers accidentally loaded six live 
nuclear warheads into a set of air-launched cruise missiles scheduled for retirement; the 
B-52 bomber carrying the missiles had flown across the continental U.S. before the 
mistake was realized.11 Huth sums these points up by suggesting that the success of 
deterrence is determined by whether or not the potential attacker ends up using sustained 
military force, and whether or not the defender capitulates to the demands of the potential 
attacker.12 If no force is used and the defender has refused to yield, deterrence has 
worked; if the attacker resorts to force or if the defender is coerced into agreeing with the 
attacker’s terms to avoid war, deterrence has failed. 
                                                
8 Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers no. 171 
(1981), http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/10B_Waltz.pdf. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Woolf, op. cit. 
12 Paul K. Huth, “The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 34, no. 2 (Jun. 1990), http://www.jstor.org/stable/174195?origin=JSTOR-
pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.  
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 Wohlstetter is more stringent and explicit than Waltz in describing the physical 
stipulations for deterrent forces. Looking pragmatically at the situation, the number one 
priority for deterrence goes not to survivability but to the stable operation of the force 
during peacetime, particularly with feasible budgets and fail-safe mechanisms.13 This 
advice was given in 1958, but it still has merit today, especially with the current 
modernization plans for the U.S. arsenal. The argument goes that if a force can withstand 
an enemy attack but is financially and technically inefficient in the long run, it needs to 
be altered immediately in order to prevent long-term consequences, such as a higher 
chance of accidents and unnecessary political tensions. After this hurdle, the next priority 
is surviving attacks, followed by improving communication measures in the case of 
retaliation, and creating a force with the accuracy and power to both defend against 
aggressive advances and overcome enemy defenses to reach targets.14 Wohlstetter’s 
analysis was limited by his concentration solely on the Soviet threat, and his work 
predated the great strides in weapons technology that have occurred over the past fifty 
years. However, his alignment of priorities is still important to consider when assessing 
the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent force for Japan and South Korea. 
Practicalities aside, there are some basic theoretical conditions needed to establish 
a successful deterrent force. First, the enemy must understand exactly what will cause (or 
prevent) the pain and destruction it desperately fears. According to Schelling, “the pain 
and suffering have to appear contingent on his behavior.”15 If the U.S. wants to avert a 
war with Russia, for example, it has to make clear to Russia that any decisive attack it 
                                                
13 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (Jan. 
1959), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029345. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Schelling, op. cit., 4. 
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makes will result in its own death and destruction, while no attacks will mean that 
Russian lives and resources are saved. This leads to the other requirement for deterrence, 
involving an overlapping of interests between states. In a hypothetical situation where 
Russia’s sole interest was to destroy the U.S., and its only cause of suffering was a U.S. 
victory, there would be no way to reach a proper deterrent solution, because any 
compromise in which the U.S. is not destroyed would be a U.S. victory, which would 
cause Russia pain and suffering. However, realistically this scenario is not the case, and 
there are some general overlapping economic and political interests between the U.S. and 
Russia, as well as other countries with tense relations. Therefore, deterrence is merely a 
bargain, “arranging for [the opponent] to be better off doing what we want – worse off 
not doing what we want – when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”16 With all 
of this in consideration, the most important measure of a deterrent force’s success is that 
its threats never actually come into fruition.  
Jervis, while acknowledging the importance of deterrence theory from writers like 
Wohlstetter, Waltz, and Schelling, provides additional insight from what is deemed the 
“third wave” of deterrence theory. Jervis argues that these third-wave scholars take into 
consideration five factors not included in earlier forms of the theory: 1) the paradox that 
statesmen must face between taking more risks and forcing an enemy retreat, versus 
taking fewer risks to make the situation safer; 2) the utility of rewards and positive 
reinforcement when negotiating potentially violent circumstances with aggressive states; 
3) the array of psychological factors that influence deterrence, including 
misunderstandings of the opponent’s values, strategies, worldviews, and intentions; 4) the 
problem of rationality and calculations in the context of statesmen’s decision making; and 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
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5) the complications of domestic and bureaucratic politics, from individual authorities to 
large group interests.17 These observations establish a more nuanced approach to 
deterrence theory, allowing analysts to examine more factors than merely a state on state 
realist perspective. Rather than look only at how the billiard balls of deterrence interact 
with each other, Jervis argues that what is going on inside the billiard balls matters just as 
much. 
Historically, deterrence was reinforced by conventional means, usually by large 
armies using weapons from bows and arrows to swords and shields to guns and tanks. 
These deterrence tools were capable of committing large-scale destruction, but they were 
expensive to maintain in terms of lives and resources. The introduction of nuclear 
weapons to the international battlefield changed this. When the atomic bomb dropped in 
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and thousands of people, the majority of them civilians, 
were extinguished by one single weapon, a message was sent to the rest of the world that 
humanity had reached a point at which it could completely destroy itself. This has led to 
new meanings for deterrence, for as Schelling stated: “Deterrence rests today on the 
threat of pain and extinction, not just on the military defeat.”18 With the touch of a button, 
causing no harm to its own forces, a state could flatten its opponent.  
Walzer interprets nuclear deterrence as “a kind of bluff;” after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, no nuclear bombs have ever been dropped on a population as a strategy of war, 
and as such nuclear weapons states have fallen into a pattern of “not only don’t we do 
anything, we also don’t believe that we will ever have to do anything,” thus the common 
                                                
17 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (Jan. 1979): 289-
324, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009945?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
18 Schelling, op. cit., p. 23 
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conception that nuclear deterrence works.19 Schelling also attributes this state of mind to 
beliefs: 
“If everybody believes, and expects to believe, that things get more dangerous when the 
first nuclear weapon goes off, whatever his belief is based on he is going to be reluctant 
to authorize nuclear weapons, will expect the other side to be reluctant, and in the event 
nuclear weapons are used will be expectant about rapid escalation in a way that could 
make escalation more likely.”20 
This sort of thought process, in which nuclear deterrence works to prevent attacks from 
enemy states but, if an attack occurs, will lead to rapid violent escalation, continues to 
influence modern day assumptions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. These in turn 
affect the strategies and modernization policies of nuclear weapons states, as well as the 
attitudes of the non-nuclear weapons states that seek protection under extended 
deterrence. 
Allison et al. wrote an intriguing piece on the ways in which policymakers 
address the issue of nuclear deterrence and the possibility of nuclear war. The authors 
categorize policymaker attitudes into three distinct camps. Hawks, the first type, have the 
motto of “peace through strength;” they are not afraid to take risks in order to appear 
legitimate and unmoving toward state opponents, and they are highly supportive of 
military might.21 Hawks see nuclear nonproliferation as a sign of weakness in the 
international anarchic system. Doves support “reassurance and compromise,” taking a 
                                                
19 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), 271. 
20 Schelling, op. cit., 158 
21 Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Hawks, Doves and Owls: A New 
Perspective on Avoiding Nuclear War,” International Affairs 61, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985): 581-
589, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2617704?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
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more diplomatic approach than that of the hawks.22 They view the maintenance of 
military preparation and nuclear arms as undermining peaceful deterrence and are too 
provoking compared to other tools such as non-military incentives, diplomatic 
communication, and compromise as proper means of deterrence. While both doves and 
hawks see war as being started deliberately, owls, the third category, worry about nuclear 
crises arising from a loss of control over the situation.23 This fits Jervis’s concerns and 
third-wave deterrence theorists, taking into consideration possible misperceptions of 
intentions, accidents, irrationality, and bureaucratic complications that arise during times 
of crisis. Owls, therefore, support deterrence policies that “avoid crises and increase 
controls” in an attempt to prevent technical and human mistakes from starting a nuclear 
war.24  
As the next section will illustrate, all of these aspects and issues of deterrence 
have influenced the U.S. development of nuclear strategy and unremittingly shaped the 
various changes in nuclear policy over the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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II. EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE U.S. SUPERPOWER 
As the first country to develop nuclear weapons, the U.S. had to develop a 
strategy for an entirely new category of warfare. As such, the focus of U.S. nuclear 
strategy has been constantly evolving through time, based on a steep learning curve 
through each phase of strategy, adjustments for significant technological advancement, 
and the dynamics of domestic and foreign relations. Important to note is that extended 
nuclear deterrence was not part of the plan when the atomic bomb was first conceived. 
Former President Truman, who authorized the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stated 
in a 1950 press conference that while he did not want to see the nuclear option being 
used, it was under active consideration to be used in warfare, particularly in the conflict 
on the Korean peninsula, and was “a matter that the military people will have to 
decide.”25 Through a combination of steady progress in nuclear warhead and delivery 
system technology, changing international norms discouraging the use of nuclear 
weapons, a growing network of allies, and the nuclear proliferation of potential enemies, 
the U.S. had to adjust its strategy to provide a nuclear deterrent for both itself and the 
countries it pledged to protect. This chapter will follow the strategies that were 
implemented in attempt to fulfill these duties, including massive retaliation, flexible 
response, counterforce, lead but hedge, and new triad, while simultaneously discussing 
the corresponding structural shifts of the physical arsenal itself. Analyzing these 
strategies will facilitate an understanding of how U.S. policy strategies and attitudes 
affect its extended deterrence capabilities and credibility. The chapter will then review 
the current status of the arsenal in terms of warheads, missile systems, and overarching 
                                                
25 Harry S. Truman, “295. The President's News Conference,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=985. 
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nuclear posture. This will show how the security situation today has evolved, and how 
modern strategies need to take into account the restrictions of nuclear technological 
advancements, due to international norms concerning the use of nuclear weapons, in 
order to provide optimal deterrence for both the U.S. and its allies.  
Setting the Stage: Early U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy 
Massive retaliation was one of the first strategies for U.S. nuclear weapons as a 
means of deterrence. Set up in the mid-1950s under the Eisenhower administration, 
massive retaliation refers to a hypothetical situation where if an aggressor state attacked 
the U.S. or its allies, the U.S. would respond with an overwhelming display of force, not 
necessarily proportionate to the level of attack. By the 1950s, the U.S. had already 
established alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Nationalist government on 
Taiwan. Then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles coined the term in a speech to the 
Council of Foreign Relations in 1954, when he noted (to President Eisenhower’s 
chagrin): 
“We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more 
effective, less costly… Local defense will always be important. But there is no local 
defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local 
defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A 
potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit 
him.”26 
The policy move was a delayed response to the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test in 
August 1949, during a period in which forces were first demobilized in the aftermath of 
World War II and then remobilized with fears of the USSR. Eisenhower wanted a policy 
that was both powerful and cost-cutting, because though nuclear weapons were 
expensive, they were not as expensive as the thousands of soldiers that had been 
                                                
26 John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Nuclear Files, 
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/article-dulles-
retaliation_1954-01-12.htm. 
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deployed across the world for the War. It was also thought at the time that once the U.S. 
had a substantial nuclear deterrent, it could scarcely be denied to its allies, and could in 
fact be extended with relatively little extra cost.27 Eisenhower reinforced these principles 
in his 1954 State of the Union address, where he affirmed the “paramount importance to 
American security of maintaining good relations with its allies,” though he made no 
explicit commitments to use the nuclear option.28 He did pledge to maintain a “massive 
capability to strike back,” and emphasized navy and air force power as well as nuclear 
weapons.29 As a preliminary nuclear strategy, massive retaliation fully embraced the 
hawkish motto of “peace through strength,” and had little emphasis on dovish or owlish 
tendencies, either for maintaining peace through non-violent means or focusing on 
reducing nuclear accidents.  
By the mid-1950s, the number of bomber aircraft and nuclear warheads in the 
U.S. arsenal had increased dramatically. Nuclear bombers had increased from 15 in 1945 
to 1,854 at their peak in 1959, while the number of nuclear warheads during the same 
time period increased from 6 to 15,468.30 The promotion of massive retaliation brought 
with it increased focus on the development of ICBMs, since the U.S. was not only 
looking for maximum “atomic striking power” but was also concerned about a potential 
“missile gap” in response to the first Soviet ICBM test in 1957. The U.S. sought to create 
an arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons forces: strategic forces were aimed at 
calculated targets including military facilities, nuclear missile bases, factories, and cities, 
                                                
27 Earl C. Ravenal, “Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection,” International Security 6, no. 4 
(Spring, 1982): 26-43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538676. 
28 Samuel F. Wells Jr., “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 1 (Spring, 
1981): 31-52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149675. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Table of US Strategic Bomber Forces,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab7.asp.; “Table of Global Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002,” 
Natural Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp. 
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while tactical forces were placed in preparation for direct use on the battlefield in the case 
of war.31 Europe first began cooperating with the U.S. to install forward deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons in 1954, followed by South Korea in 1958. 
Massive retaliation both reassured and terrified the allied states in the East Asian 
region. Reassurance came from the assumption that the U.S. would obliterate any enemy 
threatening to attack or preparing to attack an allied state; if China too aggressively 
endangered Japan’s safety, the U.S. would be there to make sure it paid the price with 
nuclear destruction. At the same time, however, massive retaliation had many potential 
problems. A worry for Japan was the potential for humanitarian and environmental 
spillover effects if China was hit by several nuclear strikes. There were also concerns 
about the accuracy and precision of the still relatively new nuclear technology, though it 
could be argued from the U.S. perspective that this sort of uncertainty actually increased 
the strength of its nuclear deterrent.32 Finally, there was the extreme nature of nuclear 
weapons, which made their use unjustifiable in almost every circumstance. The conflicts 
in Korea and Quemoy-Matsu were thus resolved without U.S. nuclear retaliation. 
Policymakers and scholars alike argued that there had to be another strategy for 
addressing threats to U.S. interests with less extreme means.33   
After increasing criticism by both foreign and domestic voices at the end of the 
1950s, the Kennedy administration reasoned that rather than concentrate all hopes and 
efforts on nuclear retaliation, especially on the tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed 
                                                
31 Hans M. Kristensen, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, May 
2012, https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf. 
32 “Atlas ICBM,” National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/mimi/learn/historyculture/atlas-icbm.htm. 
33 Richard Burns and Joseph Siracusa, A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and 
Politics (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 262, available from 
http://claremont.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1887851. 
 17 
in Europe, the response to a looming crisis should be more spread out between nuclear 
and conventional capabilities; in other words, flexible response. This strategy did not 
reject nuclear weapons entirely. If anything, it gave tactical nuclear weapons a priority 
boost.34 It merely emphasized the need to build up conventional capacities alongside 
nuclear ones to provide a wider range of military options and control the rate of 
escalation if a war were to occur. The doctrine of flexible response also reaffirmed the 
need for a continued presence of deployed US forces within allied states in Europe and 
Asia, illustrating the impact of alliances on the development of U.S. nuclear strategy. 
During this transitional period in U.S. strategy, the Cold War was still in full 
force. In the five-year period from 1960 to 1965, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was undergoing 
significant changes as the number of bombers began dropping dramatically, from 1,735 
to 807; but ICBMs were picking up the slack in numbers from 12 to 854; and SLBMs 
made an appearance with 2 in 1960 up to 384 in 1965.35 By 1961, the U.S. had officially 
established the nuclear triad, and so had the Soviet Union. These increased capacities 
brought about the first mentions of the term “mutually assured destruction,” as both 
countries realized that as they developed ever more nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems, the results of an all-out nuclear war would have growing consequences for them 
both as well as the international community as a whole.  
The main issue with the flexible response strategy was its lack of practicality. 
President Kennedy had two main complaints: 1) that tactical nuclear weapons were just 
as “handicapped” as regular strategic nuclear weapons, despite their increased accuracy 
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and higher discrimination in terms of targets; and 2) that the probability of the U.S. 
having any sort of control over escalation once a nuclear attack commenced was highly 
unlikely, adopting the owlish approach to nuclear policy.36 Flexible response folded 
nicely into the overarching strategy of limited nuclear war, which assumed that nuclear 
war could be controlled, and perhaps even won, based on technological advances 
including deployable tactical nuclear weapons and improved command, control, 
communication, and intelligence systems.37 However, opponents of the posture argued 
that once tactical nuclear weapons were used, no amount of technology would be able to 
control the rate of violent escalation, and total nuclear war would be the only foreseeable 
conclusion.38 These concerns were just as applicable to allies and extended deterrence, 
both in Europe and in Asia. If the U.S. president was worried about the lack of control 
and potential escalation effects of its nuclear arsenal, then its credibility as an effective 
protection measure could be interpreted as significantly weakened. 
As a result, the next U.S. nuclear strategy that evolved through the late 1960s into 
the 1970s was that of counterforce. Counterforce was essentially a more detailed version 
of flexible response, providing a retaliation mechanism allowing U.S. administrations to 
use a fraction of the nuclear force to attack military bases, or “military and control 
targets,” in order to disarm an opponent by preemptively destroying its nuclear weapons. 
These included nuclear missile silos, command-and-control, stationary and mobile 
military forces, and military industrial facilities.39 Counterforce differed from 
countervalue, which was first introduced in 1965, because the latter targeted industry, 
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civilian infrastructure, and other societally valuable assets.40 As the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal rapidly expanded, counterforce was the U.S. symbolic response to neutralize its 
threat capability, while also creating “crisis stability,” or a situation in which “neither 
side has an immediate incentive or need to escalate to a nuclear strike.”41 The strategy 
hearkens back to the hawkish attitude proposed by Allison, claiming peace through 
shows of force. Flexible response and counterforce were both strategies that were 
contingent on the idea of preemptive nuclear war fighting, as opposed to restraint and 
deterrence. Rather than trying to prevent war from happening in the first place, officials 
on both sides of the Cold War were convinced the other side was developing first-strike 
capabilities for initiating nuclear war, and thus came up with strategies to eliminate the 
other’s nuclear forces before they could retaliate.42 This seemed like a bonus for U.S. 
allies seeking protection, except that in the early 1970s the U.S. was also attempting to 
implement the Nixon Doctrine, which told allies to take care of their own security unless 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella was absolutely needed. The full effects of this paradox will be 
discussed in a later chapter through the case of Japan. 
Interestingly enough, though Soviet totals of nuclear warheads and delivery 
systems continued to rise through this period, the totals of U.S. nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems stagnated and in some cases even decreased. Soviet warheads increased 
by over 10,000 from 1966 to 19,055 in 1975, while the U.S. decreased its stockpile from 
31,700 to 27,052 in that same time duration.43 This was due to a number of contextual 
                                                
40 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A 
New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, 
April, 2009, http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdf. 
41 Ravenal, op. cit. 
42 Burns and Siracusa, op. cit., 405. 
43 http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp. 
 20 
factors, one being the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970 
and promoted three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, a treaty to which the U.S. was a member. During a period of tense 
relations with the Soviets, U.S. military planners were also transitioning their strategy 
from increasing the nuclear stockpile to finding new and more efficient ways of 
delivering the existing warheads.44 On the other hand, as the U.S. streamlined its forces, 
the USSR stubbornly maintained its original path by further expanding its arsenal. 
These trends were sustained in the 1980s under the Reagan Administration, which 
marked some of the most drastic innovations in nuclear weapons technology, even as the 
U.S. pared down its total numbers of warheads and delivery systems. Multiple 
independently targeted reentry vehicles, or MIRV, put multiple nuclear weapons onto 
each missile, allowing a single delivery system to hit several targets at once, thus 
increasing efficiency. Stealth aircraft and durable submarines were also developed during 
this time. The Trident II SLBMs carried the most advanced warhead in the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal, the W-88, while the Peacekeeper ICBM was given the W-87 in 1988.45 These 
changes were made in conjunction with steady Soviet warhead increases, hitting a peak in 
1986, when the Soviet Union possessed 40,723 over the U.S. arsenal of 23,254.46 The 
1980s highlighted U.S. transition from predominantly preemptive nuclear strategies to 
deterrent strategies, as it shifted its efforts to focus on advanced second-strike capabilities 
rather than all-out massive retaliation in a continuation of its policies from the 1970s. 
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Deterrence efforts continued with negotiations toward a mutual drawdown of 
nuclear weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union beginning in May 1982, though 
the official treaty, known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), was not 
signed until July 31, 1991. President Mikhail Gorbachev, struggling to maintain what was 
left of the Soviet Union, made an agreement with U.S. President George H.W. Bush to 
implement deep reductions of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, effectively ending 
the Cold War.47 START I, which entered into force on December 5, 1994, provided a 15-
year window for the U.S. and the Soviet Union (the Russian Federation after the Soviet 
Union’s December 1991 collapse) to reach a limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 
warheads for each side.48 The treaty also banned the construction of new ICBMs and 
SLBMs, with the exception of modernization programs, and had an extensive verification 
system. Arsenal drawdowns aside, in the 1990s the U.S. also withdrew its forward 
deployed nuclear weapons from South Korea, and as of 2014 has withdrawn about 90 
percent of its forward deployed nuclear weapons from Europe.49 All U.S. nuclear 
strategies prior to this point had been predominantly tailored toward a war with the Soviet 
Union; massive retaliation, flexible response, and counterforce were reactions not only to 
the capacities and efficiencies of the U.S. nuclear arsenal but also to that of its main rival. 
However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. no longer had an 
enemy threatening enough to surround with nuclear weapons at the same level. Thus 
began a new era in which the U.S. reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile, and its allies 
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wondered how credible their extended deterrence commitments still were. This will also 
be addressed from the perspective of Japan later on in the paper.  
The Post-Cold War State of Nuclear Affairs 
 The most important developments in U.S. strategy since the START I Treaty have 
been the lead but hedge concept, established under the Clinton Administration, and the 
“new triad” strategy under the George W. Bush Administration. The former was 
introduced in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and recognized the threat of rising 
nuclear proliferation in other states as higher in priority than simply balancing Russia. 
This was shown in the increasing concerns from the U.S. and its allies over deterring the 
belligerent North Korean nuclear regime. Hence, the U.S. would “lead” in disarming its 
nuclear stockpiles, but would “hedge” an affordable arsenal in the case of possible 
tensions or disruptions in the international community.50 The latter strategy, proposed by 
George W. Bush, was included in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and sought to revive 
a form of Kennedy’s flexible response with the “new triad.”51 This triad consisted of 
offensive strike systems, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense 
infrastructure, tinted with hawkish intentions in the aftermath of the events on September 
11, 2001.52  
 Since President Obama came into office on January 20, 2009, his Prague speech 
advocating nuclear zero, the 2010 New START Treaty53 that rejuvenated the arms 
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reduction process between the U.S. and Russia, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
have all contributed to shape the current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. While the Prague 
speech gave rhetorical hope to the nonproliferation movement, the New START Treaty 
was a practical application of the dovish attitude, setting fresh limits on the bilateral 
disarmament process by restricting the parties to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads and 800 delivery vehicles each by 2020.54 Meanwhile, despite the ongoing 
nuclear arms dismantlement, the U.S. is also sticking to its nuclear triad. The 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review stresses the need for all three legs of the triad, while also 
maintaining the current U.S. posture of nuclear-capable bombers off full-time alert, the 
majority of ICBMs on alert, and a significant patrol of nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) at sea at all times.55 The NPR also indicates the U.S. need for 
control in order to avert crises for as long as possible. For instance, “the United States 
would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the 
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”56 This reflects the 
administration’s recognition of the stigma that using nuclear weapons carries in the 
international community, and the need to make nuclear weapons the absolute last resort 
in order to avoid a nuclear strike from occurring, either accidentally or purposefully. 
 As of April 2015, the U.S. is estimated to possess 7,100 nuclear weapons out of a 
global total of 15,650.57 Only 1,900 of these, however, are deployed (or operational) 
strategic forces, meaning that the majority of the weapons are in reserve or are awaiting 
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dismantlement.58 Out of the 1,920 operational strategic warheads, the U.S. has 1,150 
deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 470 on intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 300 stored at bomber bases.59 Russia is the only state 
remotely close to the U.S. in terms of numbers; it actually has a higher total of nuclear 
weapons, capping at 7,500, but only has 1,780 deployed strategic forces, fewer than the 
U.S., though not by much.60 The Obama Administration has continued to stress the 
importance of further nuclear reductions in conjunction with those of Russia. There is 
still a considerable amount of warheads that needs to be maintained and managed, which 
will impact both domestic and foreign policies.  
 The modern nuclear strategy must take into account a few crucial factors. While 
non-nuclear weapons states grow increasingly impatient over the lack of faster progress 
toward nuclear disarmament, all of the nuclear weapons states are looking to modernize 
their arsenals, and none have expressed serious expectations about reaching an eventual 
ban on nuclear weapons, despite President Obama’s optimistic statements. As such, the 
U.S. must confront its own aging arsenal, a problem which has been put off by several 
presidential administrations. Its network of partner countries expects extended nuclear 
deterrence; it has a domestic sequestration budget that, if followed, would reduce the 
nuclear arsenal rather than maintaining it; and its military forces seem to have lost sight 
of the nuclear mission. The U.S. will have to craft a strategy for the future that will 
sufficiently protect the nation, satisfy its concerned allies, and maintain realistic levels of 
cost and inventory, a daunting task indeed. 
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III. ORIGINS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
 While the U.S. was making adjustments to its nuclear strategy throughout the 
twentieth century, its efforts were complicated by the bilateral security alliance with 
Japan. Japan has had diplomatic relations with the U.S. since 1860, but it did not 
establish a security-based connection with the larger superpower until after its defeat in 
World War II. This chapter will briefly explore the early stage of this security 
relationship, particularly focusing on a few main symbolic policies, in order to 
understand how two states that were mortal enemies in combat managed to create an 
arrangement that remains one of the strongest bilateral alliances today. It should be noted 
that there have never been binding public commitments between the U.S. and Japan 
detailing exact circumstances for the use of nuclear weapons.61 There are generalized 
references to the “U.S. nuclear deterrent” in certain documents, and the term “nuclear 
umbrella” is frequently used in academia, but there are no concrete guarantees that U.S. 
nuclear weapons will be used in defense of Japan. Instead, a series of historical 
agreements has shaped the nature of U.S. extended deterrence over Japan and provided a 
foundation for the shifts and periods of tension in the alliance over the following decades.  
In the aftermath of the two U.S.-deployed atomic bombs devastating the cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan surrendered and admitted defeat to the 
Allies on September 2, agreeing to meet the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which 
included the dismantlement of the Japanese leadership, Allied occupation of Japanese 
territory, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the unconditional surrender 
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of all Japanese armed forces, upon pain of “prompt and utter destruction.”62 The U.S.-led 
Government Section of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) took the 
responsibility of creating a new Constitution in 1946. Fearing that drafts supported by 
Japanese staff would be too lenient on nationalist forces, the SCAP wrote two articles to 
restructure Japanese leadership into the new constitution, which went into effect in May 
1947: Article I retained the emperor system but reduced his status to that of a symbolic 
figure, and the more dramatic Article IX demolished Japan’s previous security policy, as 
it reads: 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes.   
 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.”63 
The world was still recovering from the imperial exploits of Japan on both sides of the 
Pacific, and Article IX fulfilled the need for a formal legal measure to prevent this from 
happening ever again. At the same time, by occupying Japanese territory the U.S. had for 
the first time become responsible for keeping Japan away from any international troubles 
that might need military recourse. This quickly became relevant at the end of the decade, 
when the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 events solidified U.S. perceptions that Japan was an ally worth keeping. Article IX 
has been heavily debated in both domestic and international contexts, with some 
complaints that Article IX is too restrictive on what Japan can accomplish, and others that 
it is not restrictive enough. For nuclear policy, the problem is that Article IX has been 
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largely interpreted as prohibiting Japan from holding offensive military weapons, 
meaning it cannot have ICBMs, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, or bomber fleets on its 
territory. This means that U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities that provide Japanese 
protection, such as submarines and bombers, cannot technically patrol Japanese waters or 
refuel on Japanese bases, a logistical and political issue that in times of crisis could have 
significant repercussions for the bilateral relationship. 
In 1952, the U.S. ended its military occupation of Japan and signed the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, later 
amending it in 1960. Interestingly, while the first article of this document is similar to 
Article IX in its ideals of peace, it requires both Japan and the U.S. to “settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved in peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.”64 This front-running 
liberal ideology is quickly backed by realist Articles III and V, which commit the two 
parties to develop their own separate capacities to resist armed attack and, in the case of 
an attack against either Party in territories owned by Japan, “act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”65 The dilemma 
when it comes to an attack from nuclear weapons on Japan is that while Japan is 
constitutionally prohibited from launching an offensive, the U.S. is not. This is confusing 
when determining the exact response the U.S. should take in a hypothetical attack on 
Japanese territory. If Japan assists the U.S. with logistical or strategic support in a nuclear 
counterattack, it could be considered as a violation to both the bilateral security treaties 
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and Japan’s constitution. How far can Article IX be stretched to fit the cause of self-
defense? Different constitutional conditions are extremely damaging for the effectiveness 
of extended nuclear deterrence, because if potential foes perceive discrepancies and 
uncertainty between the allies, they might be more emboldened to test the allies in a game 
of chicken, which could lead to unnecessary violent escalation. 
The 1946 constitution and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty go hand in hand 
with the Yoshida Doctrine, developed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who served 
from 1946-1947 and 1948-1954. This doctrine remained a lasting foundation for policy 
through the Cold War and even lingers, some argue, in the decisions of the Abe 
administration.66 Its three main tenets reinforced the U.S. as the main guarantor of 
Japanese security, directed focus toward reconstructing the domestic economy through 
international economic ties, and emphasized the need to maintain a low profile in 
international affairs.67 In the context of complete military reliance, a crushed economy, 
and international status as an “enemy state”, this was a way for Japan to quietly rebuild 
and find its place in the world once more. Yoshida himself had a strong personal 
commitment toward minimizing Japanese rearmament and entrenching the norm of 
Article IX, since he disliked the Imperial military system, worried about the stability of 
Japanese economic recovery, and wanted to smooth over tensions in the international 
system.68 It was only under intense U.S. pressure that Yoshida reluctantly set up the 
“police reserve force” in 1950, responding to U.S. concerns over the Cold War and 
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Korean War. This eventually evolved into the Japan Self-Defense Forces by 1954, which 
has branches for land, sea, and air forces, and has evolved into a formidable force of 
troops, missile destroyers, tanks, and aircraft. However, these forces have no offensive 
agenda besides deployment in international peacekeeping missions under the United 
Nations, and even this has been severely limited. 69  They also do not have a nuclear 
arsenal with which to retaliate in the case of nuclear war on the Japanese homeland. This 
balance has shaped the way in which Japan approaches its own self-defense, the defense 
provided by the U.S., and also deterrence provided by the U.S. Though the Yoshida 
Doctrine is not as strongly emphasized today as it was during the Cold War, the principle 
of military reliance on the U.S. remains entrenched in Japanese foreign policy, despite 
attempts by Japanese nationalists to reverse the trend.  
The final pillar of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in regard to nuclear weapons is 
not actually a concrete piece of legislation but rather an informal principle. On December 
11, 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made a statement to the Budget Committee 
outlining the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of not possessing, not producing, and not 
permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan.70 Sato, a follower of the 
Yoshida Doctrine, understood that proposing these principles as actual legislation would 
have caused heavy disputes not only between but also within the political parties due to 
contentious opinions on defense. This could jeopardize the stability of the Japanese 
political system and possibly the power of individual officials, including Sato himself.71 
Nonetheless, the prime minister’s iconic statement remained in the hearts and minds of 
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Japanese lawmakers such that any attempt to breach the equilibrium of the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles has been met with earnest opposition. This consensus has a strong 
impact in discouraging any change in Japan’s non-nuclear stance, while simultaneously 
putting all of the pressure on the U.S. to maintain its security commitments. 
Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, the 1952 and 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, the Yoshida 
Doctrine, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles formed the groundwork on which the 
U.S. and Japan developed a security alliance incorporating nuclear weapons and 
deterrence. Japan viewed the bilateral relationship from a largely pacifist lens, reluctant 
to pursue any sort of rearmament, particularly nuclear, and favoring a low international 
profile in the interest of rebuilding the domestic sphere. The U.S., continuing its crusade 
against communism, was more than willing to keep Japan non-nuclear, but also saw the 
island state as a key geopolitical tool in containing the potential threats of China and the 
Koreas, thus pushing Japan toward the development of the Self-Defense Forces. The 
following chapter will illustrate some key events in which the strength of this alliance is 
tested, affecting national attitudes toward nuclear weapons and allied interests, which 
have an important impact on diplomatic bilateral relations and provide insight into how 
Japan will react given future changes to U.S. nuclear strategy. 
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IV. SHIFTS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
 Bilateral security ties, like any other relationship, require hard work on the part of 
both sides, particularly in times of crisis. The strongest ties are those that persevere and 
even grow stronger in the face of unanticipated obstacles. The U.S. and Japan 
encountered three such periods after the foundations of the alliance had been laid out in 
the 1940s and 1950s. The 1964 Chinese nuclear tests, the Nixon nuclear détente and 
nuclear shock of the early 1970s, and the North Korean and Chinese nuclear threats of the 
1990s all tested the U.S.-Japan alliance. Each time, the two countries reached an eventual 
compromise and maintained stable relations. This chapter will explore these three 
situations in order to understand the Japanese perception of the importance of nuclear 
deterrence. It will also evaluate the main factors that triggered Japanese concern in each 
situation, how Japan responded to these concerns, and subsequently how the U.S. 
responded with bilateral or unilateral changes in policy.  
A Response to Chinese Belligerence: The U.S. and Japan in the 1960s 
 From 1964 to 1967, China conducted six nuclear tests, each escalating in yield 
and publicity. The first, on October 16, 1964, was accompanied by an official statement 
of China’s no-first-use policy and dedication to nuclear disarmament. It was followed by 
Chinese Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai urging the leaders of the world to “reach 
agreement… that the nuclear Powers and those countries which may soon become 
nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-
nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.”72 Needless to say, the 
rest of the world was not as pleased about this proposition. Japan’s Foreign Minister 
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Etsusaburo Shiina complained to the General Assembly that the test was “open betrayal” 
of the world’s “millions upon millions of people,” and emphasized the hypocrisy of 
developing nuclear weapons while claiming the goal of abolishing them.73 Japan, among 
other countries, openly condemned both the test and the summit proposal, while other 
countries like the U.S. and West Germany condemned only the test. The lack of any 
serious diplomatic action, even by the superpowers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, 
allowed the Chinese to escalate their nuclear development plans, putting increasing stress 
on both Japan and its security ally. The world watched and waited as China continued to 
build its nuclear arsenal, eventually gaining thermonuclear capabilities and, by the sixth 
test in June 1967, reaching the capacity to detonate a bomb yielding between 3 and 7 
megatons of explosive power, larger than both the U.S. Minuteman and Polaris 
missiles.74  
 Interestingly, Japan was much less prepared for these nuclear tests than the U.S. 
In a publicly released conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and 
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, nine months before the first Chinese explosion in 
1964, Ikeda was recorded as claiming that China has “a long way [to go]” before they 
developed an actual weapon.75 Rusk, on the other hand, responded that the U.S. was 
expecting China to detonate a nuclear device in one or two years. Ikeda was more 
concerned with the threat of the USSR, amid rumors that the Communist superpower had 
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moved nuclear weapons to nearby Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.76 This aligned with the 
majority opinion in Japan, which at the time placed the Soviet Union as the “highest 
critical reaction as a disliked nation,” and put less emphasis on China.77 It also 
highlighted the misguided intelligence collected at the time by a country without a 
functioning military and severely restricted security budget. 
 During this period, the U.S. was extending its nuclear deterrence to Japan and the 
Asian region as a whole through forward deployed nuclear weapons. The bulk of them 
were placed in South Korea beginning in 1958, a collection of surface-to-surface missiles, 
cruise missiles, and nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers that totaled 950 at the peak of the 
build-up in the mid-1960s.78 In the meantime, the U.S. was stocking up Kadena Air Base 
in Okinawa with hydrogen bomb-armed F-100 fighter-bombers, as well as the TM-76 
Mace missiles, from 1954 until 1972.79 Okinawa’s geographic location made it a prime 
position for strategic deterrence efforts against China and the Soviet Union. The U.S. had 
skillfully navigated the complications of Article IX, and later the Non-Nuclear Principles, 
by not handing Okinawa’s administrative rights back to Japan when the 1960 Mutual 
Treaty was established. This allowed Japan to keep its word on forbidding nuclear bases 
on its territory, while still receiving U.S. protection.  
Japanese opinion against any sort of nuclear influence within its borders was 
amplified in November 1964, when the American nuclear-powered submarine Sea 
Dragon docked at the Japanese port of Sasebo a month after the first Chinese nuclear test 
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was conducted. The Ikeda cabinet only reluctantly approved the decision, and even then 
there was considerable pushback from opponents of the 1960 treaty, who contended that 
the visit would entangle Japan in American nuclear strategy, even though the submarine 
was not actually carrying nuclear weapons.80 Despite holding the U.S. in the highest 
regard in terms of foreign countries, the Japanese were overall skeptical of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance, one of their complaints being that the U.S. ignored Japanese input 
toward maintaining the relationship. This skepticism was combined with the opposing 
trade and strategic policies each country developed toward China; the U.S. pursued a 
policy of total embargo on trade with Communist China, while Japan even with its 
nuclear fears did not want to miss the opportunity to expand relations with its neighbor.81 
As for the nuclear weapons themselves, the Japanese were still reeling from the 
humanitarian effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, making any effort to support nuclear 
weapons in the country unacceptable, if not dangerous. So even though there was a very 
secure bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Japan on paper, there were also some 
glaring differences in opinion and policy that prevented a unified reaction to the Chinese 
nuclear tests. 
 By the sixth test in 1967, then, both countries were fostering concerns about their 
own safety against nuclear weapons. The U.S. Defense Department did not think China’s 
nuclear arsenal would be developed quickly enough for panicked decisions, but many 
Congressmen disagreed, calling for an initial deployment of anti-ballistic missile 
defenses for the protection of U.S. territory.82 This only reaffirmed Japanese strategic 
concerns; increasing Chinese belligerence was right at their door, unchecked by 
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international measures, while their main bilateral ally seemed to be looking more inward 
than outward, leaving them in a vulnerable position. Additionally, due to Japan’s 
previous focus on the Soviet Union as the main threat to nuclear security, Chinese 
nuclear tests came as somewhat of a shock.83 Suddenly, the danger of nuclear 
proliferation became more real to Japanese policymakers and scholars than ever before, 
the thought being that if China could build the bomb, other developing countries in the 
area could too. There were also no concrete diplomatic ties between China and Japan or 
China and the U.S. in this period, meaning that in the case of nuclear emergency, few 
preventative measures were in place for correcting miscommunications regarding 
intentions, and accidental or reactionary nuclear war became an unpleasantly viable 
option.  
 Japanese academics had three other concerns as a result of the Chinese nuclear 
tests of the 1960s. The first questioned the Chinese “paper tiger” attitude, first declared 
by Chairman Mao Zedong back in 1946.84 In the days before anyone besides the U.S. had 
even tested a nuclear weapon, Mao made a famous statement in August 1946 saying that 
threatening the use of atomic bombs “is a paper tiger used by the U.S. reactionaries to 
scare people.”85 His condescension toward nuclear weapons, as well as his early 
teachings that physical manpower is more crucial than weapons in deciding the outcome 
of war, led most leaders and scholars to believe that China was not serious about pursuing 
a threatening nuclear arsenal. After the tests of the 1960s, however, that paper tiger was 
looking more and more lifelike, such that some Japanese worried about the policy being 
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only a small part of a larger Chinese conspiratorial strategy, designed to undermine the 
credibility of nuclear blackmail by either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.86 Since China did 
not share the same logical reasoning as other states, they cautioned, it could be dangerous 
for Japan or the U.S. to engage in any sort of conventional deterrence, because the risk of 
miscommunication and unintended violence would be too high.  
 The second concern, addressed both in academia and policy, was the possibility of 
China using nuclear blackmail toward Japan. This is not to say that people expected a 
direct nuclear attack on Japan; the blowback costs on China, including a perfect excuse 
for U.S. retaliation and perhaps even Soviet aggression, would be much too severe for 
that to be a feasible option.87 Nevertheless, a “nuclear hostage” situation, with Japan as 
the unfortunate victim, could have shaped the U.S.-China relationship in the event of 
crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, or perhaps unexpected escalation of 
the Vietnam War.88 If China did decide to take the risk of sparking cross-Pacific enmity 
and taking Japan “hostage,” the strategy became entirely dependent on whether the U.S. 
had a credible enough extended deterrent to negotiate a salient solution. Both Japanese 
scholars and policymakers admitted that the nuclear blackmail potential only faded in 
priority if the bilateral nuclear alliance with the U.S. was strong.89 
 Then there were some who questioned the strength of this alliance in regard to the 
third concern, the U.S. capability to deter attacks against assumed future Chinese 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), not only targeted at the home turf but also at 
the territories of extended allies. Though Chinese ICBMs would not be formally 
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introduced into the arsenal until the 1970s, China’s six nuclear tests quickly galvanized 
fearful thoughts toward the future of missile capabilities. As Congress debated the 
finalities of providing new and more technologies toward nuclear weapons defense and 
deterrent systems, Japan was coming up with its own alternatives. These included the 
development of Japan’s own multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) 
nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable submarines; the abandonment of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, in fear of entrapment in international incidents such as the Vietnam War and 
other regional tiffs; and the abandonment of the entire bilateral security mechanism 
between Japan and the U.S., in order to gain ground as a completely neutral state.90 All of 
these concerns affected Japanese and U.S. apprehension toward the 1960s Chinese 
nuclear tests. 
 In response to the perceived Chinese nuclear threat, Japan, despite the 
pervasiveness of pacifist Article IX, conducted what would be its earliest and only 
nuclearization investigation for the 1968/70 Internal Report.91 This report, written by four 
Japanese university academics and commissioned by the advisory research board to 
Prime Minister Sato, is the most frequently cited document on the topic both domestically 
and internationally, despite its secret status within the Japanese government. It outlines 
the obstacles that make a Japanese nuclear weapons program counterproductive to 
national interests, addressing the three concerns discussed above. The most vital 
conclusion for the purpose of this paper is that it was not worth Japan’s effort to adopt a 
nuclear weapons regime, given the financial, technological, and political costs. The 
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benefits were reduced dependence on the U.S. and membership in the “nuclear club”, but 
given the interdependence and strong relationship between the two countries, it would 
have been a small reward for the larger price. The 1968/70 Internal Report looked at both 
the Chinese nuclear blackmail case and the U.S. credibility case, and determined the 
following logic: 
1. China will not attack Japan unless it believes the U.S. will never retaliate on 
Japan’s behalf, in other words, unless it does not believe the credibility of the U.S. 
extended deterrence. 
2. Whether or not Japan believes the U.S. extended deterrence is credible, as 
discussed in the third concern, will not affect the way China calculates U.S. 
credibility. 
3. Therefore, it is in Japan’s best interest to stick with the U.S. extended deterrence, 
and not pursue nuclear weapons of its own.92 
While the exact impact of the 1968/70 Internal Report will likely remain unknown, its 
conclusions, presented by outside Japanese academics with less incentive to skew 
numbers and opinions, could have had a major influence on the way in which Japan 
conducted diplomatic affairs with the U.S. following the Chinese nuclear tests of the 
1960s. 
 How did all of this affect the alliance, and how did both parties work together to 
relieve tensions? For the most part, public verbal assurances were the most effective 
method. In January 1965, U.S. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato assembled in 
Washington to reiterate, among other commitments, the stability of the security policy: 
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“The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that it is essential for the 
stability and peace of Asia that there be no uncertainty about Japan's security. From this 
viewpoint, the Prime Minister stated that Japan's basic policy is to maintain firmly the 
United States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty arrangements, and the 
President reaffirmed the United States determination to abide by its commitment under 
the Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside.”93 
Analysts note the importance of the phrase “any armed attack,” as it was considered by 
the Japanese to be the first time in which the U.S. explicitly promised to defend Japan 
with both conventional and nuclear forces.94 The other key factor was the enthusiasm of 
Prime Minister Sato, who confirmed after the 1965 Joint Communique that no country 
would dare to attack Japan under the cover of U.S. protection. Reassurance by the U.S. 
president was essential, but domestic concerns within Japan were much more easily 
allayed with encouragement from the Japanese leader himself. The impact of these verbal 
assurances on Japan is apparent even today, as “even the slightest change of this 
government line has caused political chaos in Japan.”95 
 The Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s were essential in the way they pushed the 
security relationship between Japan and the U.S. toward a more comprehensive nuclear 
plan. The U.S. saw that a simple bilateral mutual security treaty would not be enough to 
address the complications of external threats, as the sudden aggression from China 
caused reactionary opinions among scholars and public opinion, and even led Japan to 
consider the pros and cons of nuclearizing. Because of this, the U.S. adjusted their 
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diplomatic efforts with strong diplomatic statements and assurances for the Japanese 
leadership in order to manage the situation, and eventually reached stability once more.   
Nixon and Kissinger Shake Things Up 
 In the 1970s, Japan faced an entirely different challenge from that of the 1960s: 
dealing with sudden changes in U.S. policy. 
 President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had a distinct view for the U.S. role 
in the world. They wanted the U.S. to remain in states where it could make a difference 
and protect essential allies, specifically in the context of the Vietnam War, but they also 
wanted to give states the “freedom” to defend themselves in order to relieve some of the 
burden on U.S. economic resources. Nixon in particular had long been a proponent of 
Japanese rearmament, including the removal of pacifist Article IX. In May 1969, Nixon 
approved the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13, which suggested 
“moderate increases and qualitative improvements” for Japan’s defense capabilities, so 
long as there was no significant military buildup, especially in regard to armed forces.96 
Then, two months later in July, Nixon announced the more prominent Nixon Doctrine, 
which called for a decrease in U.S. direct involvement abroad, combined with a steady 
maintenance of existing treaty commitments and the nuclear umbrella for U.S. allies.97 
To close out the year, Nixon urged Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to “develop a significant 
military capability” and “assume a greater responsibility” for East Asian regional security 
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at a November 1969 summit.98 This summit focused on the reversion of Okinawa and its 
bases from the U.S. to Japan. 
 In the midst of all these policy advancements, some U.S. officials were harboring 
concerns about Japan’s potential to return to the world stage as a nuclear power. The 
1960s were a relatively peaceful time for Japan, even in nuclear activism, and one could 
say the period was one of “nuclear soul-searching,” to test whether Japan had the 
capability and interest for handling its own nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of 
documents like the 1968/70 Report, analysts like Herman Kahn were convinced that 
“Japan, with its economic and technological potential, would become a nuclear-armed 
superpower by the late 1980s.”99 U.S. officials were also aware of the enormous fear 
from China and both Koreas over the possibility of Japanese remilitarization. The scars of 
the war in East Asia had far from fully healed. Meanwhile, Japan had been revitalizing its 
economy over the decades since its original military occupation by the U.S., catapulting it 
to great power status in the international economy. At the same time, economic growth 
encouraged the beginnings of a more independent, nationalistic public opinion, one that 
would rely increasingly on prestige and autonomy rather than survival and dependence, 
and one that would cause heightened concerns among U.S. officials. 
 Yet the Japanese also had reason to worry about U.S. policy, specifically the 
Nixon Doctrine. They viewed it as a preview for a later U.S. withdrawal from the East 
Asian region, calling into question once again the issue of the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence in that area of the world. From the Japanese perspective, the U.S. was not only 
slowly abandoning it as an ally but was also reaching out to its political enemies, namely 
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through détente with the Soviet Union over nuclear arsenals and rapprochement with 
China.100 This was not the intent of the U.S.; if anything, the U.S. was trying to unite 
China and Japan into a trilateral strategic alliance in order to band against the Soviet 
Union, and ensuring sufficient deterrent capabilities in the region was an absolute priority 
in order to make the grand strategy happen. However, the Japanese fear of entrapment in 
other international crises, combined with the questions of U.S. credibility and Chinese 
nuclear blackmail that had been lingering since the 1960s, made a reactionary response to 
Nixon policies more and more likely.  
Yasuhiro Nakasone was one of the first Japanese officials to actively respond to 
the Nixon Doctrine and subsequent statements. The nationalistic leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the director general of the Japan Defense Agency, Nakasone 
determined that while Japan would not directly benefit from developing its own nuclear 
weapons, it needed a more secure guarantee from the U.S. in terms of maintaining proper 
defensive forces. Nakasone ruffled feathers in the diplomatic communities of both parties, 
as he “sought to obtain explicit reassurance from U.S. military officials of nuclear 
protection and even suggested that Japan should allow the United States to bring nuclear 
weapons into Japan in emergencies.”101 Nothing too productive came from the Nakasone 
initiative, namely because of the difficulties of getting such extreme measures through 
the U.S. and Japanese legislatures and the contradictory diplomacy of the Foreign 
Minister Kiichi Aichi, who took a more moderate stance. In spite of this, Nakasone laid 
the groundwork for a few more Japanese nationalistic reactions to Nixon policies to 
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reignite a serious debate on nuclear weapons and how they should best protect Japan in 
light of external threats. 
 Just as the responses to the Nixon Doctrine were dying down, Nixon added fuel to 
the fire of tensions in the U.S.-Japan security relationship in July 1971, when he made an 
official visit to China without informing Japanese Prime Minister Sato until three minutes 
beforehand.102 This diplomatic disaster, known as the “Nixon Shock,” came especially 
hard to the Japanese. The last thing Japan wanted to see was “Japan Passing,” in other 
words, the U.S. bypassing it on the list of priorities to visit the Chinese, one of its more 
bitter political enemies. Serious damage was done to the trust and confidence between the 
two governments, as well as to the domestic and international reputation of Prime 
Minister Sato. Anti-U.S. sentiments increased in Japan in response to Japanese officials’ 
perception of having been deceived by policymakers such as Nixon and Kissinger. This 
was not helped by the apparent double standard of Nixon and Kissinger, who wanted at 
all costs to prevent Japan-China collusion against the U.S. At the January 1972 summit 
with Sato and the February 1972 summit with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Nixon and 
Kissinger used tailored diplomatic arguments in an attempt to persuade the leaders of 
both countries that staying with the U.S. and not normalizing Japan-China relations was 
the optimal path.103  
 The U.S. was not the only one with tools in its belt, however. While they indeed 
felt betrayed by the larger superpower in the aftermath of the Nixon Shock and the 
February 1972 China summit, Japanese officials were also aware of their strategic 
location for U.S. tactics in the region, and therefore understood that using the threat of 
                                                
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
 44 
blocking access to military facilities, specifically Yokota Base in western Tokyo, could 
be leverage toward having a voice in deciding nuclear policy.104 Though nuclear weapons 
were being removed from Kadena Air Base, Yokota still made up an important part of the 
strategic triad with fighter wings in South Korea and the Philippines to deter attacks from 
China. It could also be said that Japanese officials were tired of the “China-first attitude,” 
which seemed prevalent at the higher levels of U.S. government. With heightened 
concerns over the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia, and dwindling domestic 
admiration for the U.S., Japan faced a greater nationalistic desire for diplomatic 
independence and, as a result of its economic growth, more recognition as a great 
power.105 Nixon soon saw the effects of his audacity on Asian regional diplomacy, as 
Japan embarked on a policy pattern of “U.S. Passing,” forgoing prioritizing U.S. interests 
and openly seeking its own relationships with other states. In September 1972, newly 
instated Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing and worked with 
Premier Zhou to end the “abnormal state of relations” between Japan and China and 
establish diplomatic normalization. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev received Tanaka in 
Moscow in October 1973 to discuss further development of diplomatic and trade relations 
between the two countries, especially in regard to the Northern Territories and Siberian 
natural resources.106 And disregarding Kissinger’s recommendation to not pursue 
unilateral diplomacy in the Middle East, Japan supported oil-producing Arab states in the 
October 1973 Arab-Israeli War in order to protect its valuable Persian Gulf oil supply, 
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contrary to efforts made by the U.S.107 All of these provided irritants in the U.S.-Japan 
security relationship that brought up questions on both sides as to the credibility of the 
arrangement, particularly on the important and expensive issue of nuclear deterrence. 
 By 1973, the Nixon administration definitely had concerns about the Japanese 
potential to develop its own nuclear deterrent. The U.S. Department of Defense saw the 
rise of Japanese nationalism as a key catalyst toward such a goal. However, the NSC staff 
had more pragmatic views of the situation, reporting that while the possibility for 
Japanese nuclearization did exist, it would take Japan a considerably long period of time 
to construct and would be unnecessarily costly, matching the observations of the 
Japanese themselves.108 Hence, as the U.S. transitioned into a new presidency with 
Nixon’s resignation, a more moderate policy toward Japan began to emerge. The first 
positive diplomatic sign came when new President Gerald Ford, in an effort to boost the 
bilateral relationship, made an official visit to Japan in November 1974 and became the 
first U.S. president to do so.109 1975 marked a revival of goodwill in Asian relations, as 
the Vietnam War ended in April, and in December, Ford introduced the New Pacific 
Doctrine, which had three main premises relevant to Japan: 1) the U.S. needed to 
continue providing physical strength to maintain the balance of power in East Asia; 2) the 
bilateral relationship with Japan was a “pillar” of U.S. strategy; and 3) the U.S. would 
continue to normalize relations with China.110 Japan responded by drafting its first 
National Defense Program Outline in 1976, led by then Prime Minister Takeo Miki, 
which provided a comprehensive national defense strategy and strove to limit the quantity 
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of peacetime expenditures while improving the quality.111 To round out the period of 
positivity, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, the subcommittee for 
defense cooperation under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, published the 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation on November 27, 1978. This document, 
which focuses on the two countries’ deterrence posture, defense against armed attacks, 
and bilateral cooperation in the case of external threats that might influence Japan,112 
restated the commitment of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, as well as “the forward 
deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.”113 
Thus, the tensions through the Nixon Doctrine, the Nixon Shock, and manipulative 
diplomacy of the great powers lessened slightly in light of new, cooperative policies, 
though lingering issues of politics and Japanese constitutional restraints continued to 
provide new challenges to the bilateral relationship. 
 Wohlstetter noted on the nature of U.S. nuclear deterrence: “If dangers are small 
because they would produce a U.S. response, then if we want to keep them small, we 
should do nothing that would greatly diminish the plausibility of U.S. response.”114 The 
U.S. and the Nixon administration learned this lesson firsthand in the context of the 
alliance with Japan in the 1970s. When the Nixon Doctrine threatened to withdraw some 
U.S. forces in the region, Japan saw the move as both abandonment and opportunity. 
Together with the Nixon Shock, the Nixon Doctrine produced more chaos and 
misunderstanding than any policy since the military occupation in the 1940s, and 
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heightened the danger in terms of nuclear deterrence and the possibility of armed conflict. 
Yet, as Wohlstetter commented:  
“If the failure were only a lapse in understanding at the highest level of the 
American government about the importance and the past role of American foreign 
policy in Japanese internal politics, the Japanese might still have to wonder why 
there was such a lapse; and whether our leaders would have acted any differently 
if they had been better informed.”115 
For the future of extended nuclear deterrence and the security relationship with Japan, it 
will be crucial to keep in mind the historical precedents that made the 1970s one of the 
tensest periods between the two countries. 
The 1990s: Enter the Koreas 
 After the Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s and the uproar of the Nixon 
administration policies in the 1970s, there was a relative lull in the Japan-U.S. security 
relationship until the end of the Cold War at the turn of the 1990s. At this point two new 
actors became prominent in the East Asian security paradigm: North and South Korea. 
Japan had not been directly involved with the Koreas since it occupied those territories in 
the early 1900s, and at first it was mainly concerned with South Korea and the diplomatic 
ties it was establishing with China and the Soviet Union.116 However, when the 
development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs resulted in the 
nuclear crisis of 1994 and the Taepodong launch of 1998, Japan experienced two major 
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peaks of tension with the U.S. that altered the way in which both countries viewed each 
other’s security commitments.    
 From 1990 to 1991, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear strategic warheads dropped from 
5,330 to 3,400.117 At the same time, the forward deployed weapons systems in South 
Korea were being dismantled and removed, ICBM launchers were almost halved in 
quantity, and nuclear submarines, SLBM launchers, and even bombers faced dramatic 
decreases.118 Then, after 1991, there were small fluctuations within the numbers of all 
these categories but the overall trend pointed toward further reductions. These statistics 
reflected the impact of START I (even though it was not officially entered into force until 
1994), as well as Clinton’s lead but hedge strategy, to maintain effective deterrent forces 
while also providing a strong example for the rest of the world in disarmament. 
 Japan’s adverse reaction to the 1994 nuclear crisis can be traced back to its 
actions in 1989 and 1990. After a comfortable period of growth in the 1980s, Japan 
became embroiled in the “Lost Decade,” during which a sharp increase in inter-bank 
lending rates in 1989 led to the burst of the Japanese asset price bubble and the crash of 
the Japanese stock market, causing severe economic repercussions throughout the 1990s. 
These financial struggles, combined with Japan’s desire to develop its own autonomous 
foreign policy from the U.S. and South Korea, influenced the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry’s decision to issue a statement in January 1989 indicating Japan’s neutral stance 
toward North Korea, despite U.S. and South Korean opposition.119 This remark was 
followed by a set of negotiations between North Korean representatives and Deputy 
                                                
117 “Table of US Nuclear Warheads,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab9.asp. 
118 Ibid. 
119 David Fouse, “Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?,” Asian 
Affairs 31, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 102-20, accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172611. 
 49 
Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru in September 1990, which resulted in a Three-Part 
Declaration between Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Socialist Party 
and North Korea’s Korean Workers Party.120 Though this declaration never came into 
force, its terms, which sought negotiations to establish official diplomatic relations 
between North Korea and Japan, and called for Japan to apologize and compensate North 
Korea for atrocities from the early 1900s Japanese occupation period, greatly alarmed the 
U.S. After all, perhaps with lingering resentment from the Nixon Shock, Japanese 
officials had conveniently neglected to consult either the U.S. or South Korea on their 
plans.121 Frantic diplomatic scuffles ensued in an attempt to realign Japanese policy, and 
U.S. reprimands led Japan to create a new normalization policy more similar to that of its 
allies. However, the seeds of tension between Japan and the U.S. had been planted, 
contributing to the diplomatic fiasco of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 After test launching a long-range missile, the Nodong-1, into the East Sea/Sea of 
Japan in May 1993, North Korea caused peak anxiety levels in the U.S. and its allies in 
April 1994, when it removed spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor but 
refused to disclose them to international inspection.122 These fuel rods contained valuable 
evidence which could point to the development of a nuclear weapons program. Japan had 
every reason to fear these advances; not only could North Korea theoretically attack cities 
throughout Japan, including southern cities like Osaka, with its long-range missiles, but 
also it could be arming them with nuclear warheads. Unfortunately, it was also torn by its 
overwhelming worry of entrapment. Hence, when tensions were escalating and the U.S. 
called on Japan to support it in preparation for potential hostilities through intelligence 
                                                
120 Ibid. 
121 Fouse, op. cit. 
122 Kang and Kaseda, op. cit. 
 50 
gathering and other rear-area logistical backing, Japan was caught off guard.123 Having 
no specific contingency plan for supporting U.S. forces outside of a direct attack on Japan, 
and worrying that such action would violate Japan’s ban on collective defense, Japan 
refused to respond to the U.S. request.124 Though former U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
was able to defuse the tensions by visiting Pyongyang in June 1994 and setting a path 
toward the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in October, it 
was clear that more work was needed to solidify a productive U.S.-Japan alliance. As a 
result, Japan revised its National Defense Program Outline in 1995, adding that in 
security situations involving “areas surrounding Japan,” Japan will more actively support 
UN efforts and “the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. 
agreement.”125 The U.S. had to make sure that Japan stayed in line and understood that 
there was a limit to the freedom of determining foreign policy under the alliance, 
especially when the two countries were so closely engaged in similar regional issues. 
Japan and the U.S. also issued a Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, reaffirming 
the importance of the Mutual Security Treaty, even after the major threat of the Cold War.  
 While these agreements gave the impression that they would prevent future 
discrepancies in policy, the Taepodong incident in August 1998 made it seem like none 
of it had ever happened. Despite U.S. demands for Japan to align with its North Korea 
policy, it still neglected to fully integrate Japan into the information-sharing network it 
had in place with South Korea since the Korean War in the 1950s.126 This meant that 
when the North Korean two-stage long-range missile, Taepodong-1, was fired over Japan 
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in late August 1998, Japan responded in its own unique way, without considering the 
interests of its allies. Among its many threats, its withdrawal as a key financial sponsor of 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), suspension of 
normalization talks with North Korea, and freezing of food and other humanitarian 
support to North Korea were most prominent (and distressing).127 The U.S. and South 
Korea, who were more interested in getting a positive deal out of North Korea than 
provoking it through intimidation, were appalled by Japan’s audacity, and in the end were 
more supportive of the North Korean side. The U.S. affirmed North Korea’s claim that 
the Taepodong was a satellite launch instead of Japan’s accusation that it was a missile 
test, and forced Japan back into its position as a KEDO supporter.128 Japan had no 
feasible alternative: it could not feel safe without U.S. protection, and in order to continue 
receiving U.S. protection it had to maintain the trilateral alliance with South Korea and 
improve information-sharing and military relationships. A diplomatic method called the 
Perry process was implemented to narrow the policy gap among the three countries, and 
established the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in April 1999.129 The 1998 
U.S. Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific focused on the bilateral relationship with 
Japan as “the linchpin of U.S. security strategy in Asia,” and the revised Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, approved by the Japanese Diet on May 24, 1999, 
provided more specificity on cooperation and planning in response to threats directly and 
indirectly related to Japan.130 
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 In spite of these reinforcements of the alliance, the threat from North Korea and 
the pressures from the U.S. to redirect Japanese foreign policy did give incentive to Japan 
to consider its own defense capabilities in a way that was not seen during the Cold War. 
In November 1998, for example, Japan announced its intentions to develop its own 
surveillance satellite system, and in March 1999, JDA Director General Norota Hosei 
informed a Diet defense panel that if a missile attack on Japan was “imminent,” Japan 
had the right to make preemptive military strikes.131 These proactive moves, in addition 
to the decision to obtain mid-air refueling aircraft for the purpose of long-range strike 
missions by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, illustrated that while Japan has had a 
pervasive culture of pacifism, it is not necessarily one widely shared by all in the 
Japanese government, and therefore not necessarily a permanent one.  
Conclusion 
 The Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s, the Nixon policies of the 1970s, and the 
rise of the North Korean nuclear regime in the 1990s provided three main periods of 
tension for the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Reacting both to these changes and the trends 
in the structure and quantity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Japan often developed 
controversial policies that shook the alliance and required a considerable amount of 
diplomatic effort to resolve. The U.S. was good at fixing these issues once they had 
become large enough to notice, but it also continued to make mistakes by leaving Japan 
out of important policy and information-sharing and remaining ambiguous on its security 
commitments. Japan’s attraction to the nuclear deterrent was apparent throughout these 
periods, despite domestic opposition to having nuclear weapons on physical Japanese 
territory. It was simply too cost effective and easy to remain under the U.S. nuclear 
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umbrella, and a real conventional or nuclear force would violate the constitutional 
restraints placed on Japan since World War II. As the focus of this paper turns to current 
challenges and changes in domestic and international policy for both countries, these 
historical precedents make useful comparisons when determining the triggers for 
Japanese concerns in the alliance and the appropriate U.S. responses to mitigate those 
concerns.  
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V. THE ALLIANCE TODAY 
Having examined the three main periods of tension related to nuclear weapons 
that tested, but did not break, the security relationship between Japan and the U.S., this 
paper now turns to the present. The past few years have brought several important 
changes to the way both sides view the bilateral alliance, giving it unique context today 
that did not exist in the 1960s, 1970s, or 1990s. This chapter will outline first the main 
framework of the U.S.-Japan extended deterrence relationship today, encompassing both 
diplomatic and military cooperative efforts. The second part will analyze the concerns 
held by both the U.S. and Japan in regard to this alliance as well as to the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. These range from U.S. nuclear modernization plans to Japanese apprehension of 
abandonment in the face of regional conflict.  
Alliance 101: Modern U.S.-Japan Security Relations 
 There are currently 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan, spread out between 90 
different military facilities within the territory.132 In exchange for Japanese hosting of 
soldiers, the U.S. provides Japan with extended deterrence, using both conventional and 
nuclear arsenals. Most experts assert that the original, asymmetric alliance between the 
two countries has evolved into a “more balanced security partnership,” particularly since 
the turn of the century.133 Recognizing that information sharing and discussions were 
essential to appeasing Japan’s concerns about the alliance throughout history, the U.S. 
established two different diplomatic mechanisms. The Cabinet-level Security 
Consultative Committee, also known as the “2+2” since they are composed of the U.S. 
Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts, meets to present 
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alliance concerns at a general level and releases public statements with their goals and 
strategies.134 The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, on the other hand, works 
specifically for the purpose of U.S. assurance for its ally, and allows for an exchange of 
opinions and strategies to influence subsequent nuclear policies. An example of this is the 
Japanese policy makers’ impact on the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; according to 
reports, the Japanese dissuaded an attempt to determine the “sole purpose” of U.S. 
nuclear weapons as deterring nuclear attack.135 
 As part of the more balanced alliance, Japan has also been working toward 
bolstering its own defenses, specifically in the realm of ballistic missile defense (BMD). 
After its 2003 purchase of technologies and interceptors developed by the U.S., Japan has 
become the second most potent BMD capability in the world, working with the U.S. to 
deploy both ground-based BMD units and BMD-capable ships.136 When Prime Minister 
entered his second term in office in September 2012, he authorized the first increase in 
the Japanese budget in years, a 0.8 percent jump for the fiscal year (FY) of 2013.137 From 
that point on, there were three major developments in Japanese defense policy. The first 
was the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which 
introduced the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on international 
cooperation, and stressed the need for new military hardware, as well as “extensive 
persistent ISR,” referring to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.138 
Concurrently published on December 17, 2013 was Japan’s first ever National Security 
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Strategy. This document reinforced the “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and laid out 
the country’s three objectives of deterring threats toward Japan, improving the security 
environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and improving the global security environment, 
keeping in mind the “complex and grave national security challenges.”139 Moreover, on 
July 1, 2014, Abe announced in a press conference that according to a Cabinet decision, 
Japanese forces would be able to come to the aid of other countries under very specific 
circumstances.140 This was a revolutionary reinterpretation of the constitution and the 
right of “collective self-defense,” and would permit more flexible Japanese engagement 
in activities such as noncombat logistical operations, defense of distant sea lanes, and 
U.N. peacekeeping operations.141 
To round out the alliance, the U.S. and Japan are currently in the process of 
revising the bilateral Mutual Defense Guidelines, which have not been changed since 
1997. On his visit to Tokyo in April 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called the 
revisions transformative for U.S. military ties with Japan, one main objective being to 
establish new guidelines for cooperation in the fields of cyber warfare, military uses of 
space, and ballistic missile defense, among others. The other major change, according to 
U.S. officials, would “allow Japan to respond to an attack on the U.S. military even if the 
American forces are not acting in defense of Japan at the time.”142 It is assumed that the 
finalized guidelines will be published in time for Abe’s visit to Washington on April 28. 
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U.S. Concerns 
 The U.S. has two main concerns when it comes to the nuclear weapons posture 
and the bilateral relationship with Japan: the direction of nuclear modernization, and the 
possibility of reemerging hostile Japanese policies.  
Nuclear modernization 
 As mentioned earlier in this paper, Obama’s 2009 Prague speech and the success 
of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Russia and the U.S. brought a 
fresh wave of hope to the nonproliferation regime, particularly in regard to the possibility 
of a global nuclear zero. However, recent events have seen a gradual but steady disregard 
for these ideals on both the U.S. and Russian sides, leading to more perceptions of 
urgency toward nuclear modernization. 
 At the current moment, the fate of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is more closely tied to 
that of the Russian nuclear arsenal than any time since the Cold War. Woolf of the 
Congressional Research Service notes that while the Bush Administration denied any 
connection between the U.S. arsenal and Russia’s, since “the United States and Russia 
were no longer enemies,” the Obama Administration has taken the opposite approach, 
arguing that the relationship between the sizes of the two arsenals is still relevant.143 The 
Administration has staunchly refused to make unilateral cuts to its arsenal, and will 
further reduce the numbers of warheads under New START Treaty limits only if it is 
paralleled by Russia.  
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According to President Obama, “The New START Treaty responsibly reduces the 
number of nuclear weapons and launchers that the United States and Russia deploy, while 
fully maintaining America’s nuclear deterrent.”144 The goal of the treaty is to reach a 
deployed strategic nuclear arsenal limit of only 1,550 warheads, as well as a cap of 700 
total nuclear missiles and heavy bombers, on each side by 2018.145 As of April 1, 2015, 
Russia is reported to possess 1,780 deployed strategic warheads, while the U.S. possesses 
1,900.146 Each country has increased its number of deployed nuclear warheads over the 
most recent six-month period, the U.S. increasing by 57 additional warheads, Russia by 
131, an anomaly that prominent Federation of American Scientists researcher Hans 
Kristensen believes is nothing to be worried about, but which certainly illustrates the 
slow rate of disarmament in recent years.147 
 Furthermore, after the Russian invasion of Crimea in March 2014, unnamed 
Russian officials from the Defense Ministry gave interviews to media outlets expressing 
their displeasure of the “groundless threats to Russia from the U.S. and NATO regarding 
its Ukrainian policy,” and hinted at the possibility of suspending permission for the U.S. 
to carry out New START-mandated inspections in Russia.148 This fortunately never came 
about, but the aggressive remarks highlighted the increased activity on the Russian side 
related to nuclear forces. Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s 
Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, seemed to have a similar attitude 
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when he stated in January 2015: “I am not ruling out the possibility that Washington 
could force us to… adjust our policy in this area.”149  
 Supplementing these sorts of declarations is the effort by Russia, and indeed by 
all of the other nuclear weapons states, to modernize their nuclear arsenals. While it is 
estimated that only 10 percent or $54 billion of Russia’s defense budget will go toward 
its aging nuclear forces, the U.S. is also concerned with the recent developments of 
Russian medium-range cruise missiles, large ballistic missile submarines known as 
“boomers,” and attack submarines.150 France is deploying new missiles and warheads 
expected to last until the 2050s; Pakistan is working on new cruise missiles and short-
range rockets; and even NATO forces will be updated with new B61 guided bombs and 
nuclear F-35A fighter-bombers to be implemented in the 2020s.151 In this environment, 
the U.S. is and plans to continue mirroring the other nuclear weapons states in 
modernizing its own nuclear arsenal. 
 The push for nuclear zero is also stymied by no other than U.S. non-nuclear allies. 
Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury 
Institute of International Studies at Monterey, stated that in the current environment, “the 
primary source of nuclear deterrence for US allies comes from the strategic triad of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and bombers.”152 
When the U.S. even remotely considers removing a leg of the triad or implementing 
severe drawdowns of the arsenal, it brings the scrutiny of its allies, and in the end it 
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comes down to how well the U.S. can convey its intentions. If Tokyo and Seoul are not 
convinced that the existing arsenal will protect their cities just as well as Los Angeles and 
New York, there will be a serious confidence problem. And since both countries have 
considered their own nuclear weapons programs in the past, the more assurances they 
have, the safer and more stable the region will be.  
 External factors aside, Woolf identifies two major internal domestic factors 
playing a role in the U.S. nuclear modernization issue: overall cost, and security and 
management issues.153 The practical reality is that the U.S. cannot afford an excessive 
nuclear arsenal, and the nuclear weapons and delivery systems it has now are “reaching 
the end of their service lifetimes.”154 Therefore, as Congress examines the modernization 
budget provided by the Obama Administration and the military, determining the optimal 
amount and positioning of these weapons will also determine the future nuclear force’s 
size and structure. In January 2015, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that over 
the 10-year period from 2015 to 2024, the nuclear budget will cost the U.S. $348 billion, 
averaging $35 billion a year.155 However, this does not properly show what Defense 
Department officials are calling the “modernization mountain” of the late 2020s, when 
the U.S., given the current trajectory, will attempt to replace all three legs of the triad and 
buy new fighter planes at the same time.156 Over the next thirty years, the James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies estimated in 2014 that costs to maintain the current 
arsenal, buy replacement systems, and upgrade existing nuclear bombs and warheads will 
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reach $1 trillion.157 Though Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has staunchly supported 
the full nuclear triad, whether the U.S. will have the financial capability to achieve these 
plans among all of its other commitments will certainly be a point of contention over the 
next few decades. Following this train of thought, the security and management issues 
facing the nuclear enterprise are just as much a result of cost as they are of neglect by 
higher-level administration. The incident of a B-52 bomber accidentally carrying live 
warheads across the country in 2007; the unintentional shipment of Minuteman III 
missile nosecones to Taiwan in 2008; and the widespread cheating scandal among Air 
Force ICBM launch crews in 2012 are only a few of the many problems the U.S. has 
faced in failing to provide adequate purpose for the various branches of the nuclear 
enterprise, hindered further by the lack of sufficient resources to maintain and improve 
the system. If the U.S. wants to demonstrate to the world that it has a tight, efficient, 
dangerous arsenal, then it has to think long and hard about the cost of its operations, as 
well as the effect it has on both the physical and human forces responsible for the 
enterprise. 
 Matthew Kroenig wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that a failure to 
modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be “irresponsible,” claiming that: “a crippled 
U.S. nuclear force would embolden enemies, frighten allies, generate international 
instability, and undermine U.S. national security. In other words, it would risk ruining the 
world that currently exists.”158 This ideology is fully embraced by the U.S. military, as 
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seen in the ongoing modernization plans for the nuclear arsenal. There are three main 
categories: modernized strategic delivery systems, refurbished nuclear warheads, and a 
modernized nuclear weapons production complex, the last one referring namely to a 
proposed Uranium Processing Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is scheduled to 
cost between $6.5-7.5 billion.159 Strategic delivery systems upgrades include: the 
reconstruction of the Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs, extended service 
lives for the current ballistic missile submarines as well as the development of new 
replacement ones, ongoing B-2 and B-52H bomber technical updates, and plans to 
develop a new Long-Range Bomber and Long Range Standoff Missile.160 Moreover, the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has and will continue to implement 
Life Extension Programs for the entire U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads and bombs. 
Potential for the reemergence of reactionary Japanese policies 
 Despite the progress of the U.S.-Japan alliance in becoming more equal partners, 
the U.S. still retains concerns and frustrations about past and potential reactionary 
policies from the Japanese government. Some historical concerns were highlighted in the 
last chapter, when Japan reacted to events such as the Chinese nuclear tests in the 1960s, 
the Nixon policies of the 1970s, and the North Korean nuclear incidents in the 1990s. 
However, there are a few other, more tenacious issues that, should Japan react poorly, 
will squander U.S. efforts in the region and lower the effectiveness of the extended 
deterrence-based alliance. These issues involve Yasukuni Shrine, the controversy over 
wartime comfort women, and the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
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 The issue over Yasukuni Shrine remains relevant to the alliance as Japan begins 
to loosen some of the stringent restrictions on the use of its Self-Defense Forces. 
Yasukuni Shrine houses the spirits of the 2.5 million Japanese citizens who lost their 
lives in various conflicts, including World War I and World War II, enshrined in the form 
of “written records, which note name, origin and date and place of death.”161 The 
controversy arises from the 14 Japanese Class A war criminals who were convicted for 
crimes in World War II; these individuals remain enshrined at Yasukuni with the others, 
and continue to be visited by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members. Abe himself 
caused a controversy in December 2013 when he visited the site, sparking criticism from 
China and South Korea as well as the U.S. While Abe seems to have tempered his views 
on the issue (in 2014 he visited an alternative site called Chidorigafuchi National 
Cemetery to honor the war dead, instead of Yasukuni), the issue could easily become a 
point of argument strong enough to divide the region, which is hardly in U.S. interests. It 
also means that China and South Korea have stronger reason to oppose Abe’s 
constitutional reinterpretation in July 2014, and will no doubt continue to express 
opposition even at the revision of the Mutual Defense Guidelines. 
 The comfort women policy was instated by the Japanese imperial military during 
its expansion in the 1930s and 1940s, authorizing the practice of forced prostitution.162 It 
has been largely condemned by the international community, even by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2007. However, the Abe Administration has been reluctant to 
acknowledge these atrocities, which affected countries from South Korea to Vietnam to 
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Burma and Timor.163 Abe has done seemingly everything possible to undermine progress 
on this issue. In 2006, he called into question a 1993 joint statement with South Korea 
called the Kono Statement, which apologized to the comfort women victims and 
officially acknowledged the responsibility of the Japanese military.164 Though no changes 
were made to the statement, Abe proceeded in October 2014 to appoint Hirofumi 
Nakasone as the chair of a commission to “consider concrete measures to restore Japan’s 
honor with regard to the comfort women issue.”165 Nakasone is the son of Yasuhiro 
Nakasone, former prime minister of Japan, reactionary Nixon-era JDA leader, and the 
creator of the first “comfort station” back in 1942. These kinds of diplomatic misconduct 
harm the reputation of Japan, and by association, the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. continues 
to watch Japan closely on the issue and counter when necessary in order to maintain its 
strong alliances. 
 Finally, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is the most illustrative example of a 
regional tiff that can easily spill over into unpleasant scenarios for the U.S. This small 
group of islands is administered by Japan but claimed by both China and Taiwan, and has 
been a contentious location due to its cultural history and nearby energy deposits. The 
issue returned to the foreign policy spotlight in August 2012, when the Japanese 
government purchased three of the five islands from a private landowner, hoping to gain 
more legitimacy over the territory. China responded with anti-Japan protests, a drop in 
Sino-Japanese trade, and regular deployments of maritime law enforcement ships near the 
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islands.166 As both countries scramble their fighter jets and play a ridiculous game of 
brinkmanship, the U.S. has every right to be concerned. Despite it taking no official side 
in the territorial dispute, the U.S. has in theory taken the Japanese side due to its 
commitments under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states the U.S. must 
protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan,” the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
being part of those administrated territories.167 As a result, if things get ugly between 
China and Japan, and threats of violent conflict grow more realistic, the U.S. would have 
to choose between upholding its defense commitments for an ally and starting a war with 
China. It is a highly unfavorable position to be in, and thus the U.S. maintains some 
concerns about the effects of stubborn Japanese policies. 
Japanese Concerns 
 In relation to the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and its nuclear arsenal, Japan has 
two main concerns: the possibility of military entrapment in future conflicts, and 
abandonment in the face of regional and international foes. While both concepts are 
crucial aspects of Japanese perspective, abandonment has become the more predominant 
of the two in recent years. 
Entrapment 
 It is important here to make the distinction between entrapment and entanglement, 
though some scholars have used the terms interchangeably. Entanglement is defined as 
the process by which a state is compelled by the contents of its alliance to aid an ally in a 
“costly or unprofitable enterprise.”168 An example of entanglement is Japan involving the 
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U.S. in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute under the parameters of the 1960 Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security, even though the U.S. has no significant interest in the 
islands. The U.S. is required to uphold its commitments on an issue that has no direct 
pertinence to its interests, specifically due to one of the main pillars of the bilateral 
alliance. On the other hand, one of the most convincing definitions of entrapment entails: 
“a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or 
offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement.” Japan was deeply concerned 
about entrapment in the 1950s, before the signing of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security. A weaker power at the time and with little control over the 
actions of the U.S., Japan was worried about the potential for entrapment in America’s 
aggressive crusade against Communist countries, especially with American military bases 
on its territories and a somewhat ambiguous security alliance.169 Nowhere in the major 
alliance documents is there mention of Japanese commitment to prevent the spread of 
communism at all costs. Because of this, Japanese officials, supported by the Japanese 
public, took proactive diplomatic steps to ensure that by the time the 1960 treaty came 
around, entrapment would no longer be as pressing of an issue. On a general scale, Japan 
is more focused on the dangers of entrapment with the U.S. than entanglement. 
The chances of an entrapment scenario are relatively rare, but nevertheless, there 
are two types that Japan is most concerned about: regional entrapment and international 
entrapment. Regional entrapment is most apparent with Japan’s neighbor and minor rival, 
South Korea. Both countries are closely allied with the U.S., and neither country is 
particularly fond of the other, though both rely on each other in the general security 
framework. In regard to this strange dynamic, a worry for Japan is that if the U.S. gives 
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too much strength, particularly in nuclear backing, to South Korean defenses, North 
Korean fears of encirclement will increase, making the region even more volatile.170 It 
could embolden South Korea toward its northern neighbor, and it could affect Japan 
internally, since it has a pro-DPRK resident population, called Chosen Soren, which has 
already been embroiled in several controversies with Japanese nationalists.171 Too much 
Southern provocation of the North, if backed by U.S. nuclear power, could eventually 
cause a preemptive reaction by North Korea, which would undoubtedly involve Japan 
due to its geographic proximity and relationship with the U.S.172 In addition to the Koreas, 
Japan also harbors concerns about regional entrapment with Russia. The U.S. is taking a 
more aggressive stance toward Russia, especially in light of the Ukraine conflict and the 
controversy over Russia’s potential violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty. Given these issues, taking into consideration Japan’s existing territorial disputes 
with Russia, Japan could be pulled into a conflict not explicitly listed in its treaty 
agreements with the U.S. Japan did not want to fight the Soviet Union back in World War 
II; it certainly does not want to face Russia as an adversary now. 
International entrapment for the U.S.-Japan alliance is mostly enshrined in 
overseas conflicts such as the Iraq War in 2003. When the U.S. took an offensive stance 
in the conflict and announced the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, its allies, 
most of whom did not have direct interests in the conflict, were faced with a tough choice. 
They could refrain from participation and potentially lose support from the dominating 
superpower, or support the war and risk the lives of their own citizens. Japan and South 
                                                
170 Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, 
and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261-
91, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013998. 
171 Cha, op. cit. 
172 Ibid. 
 68 
Korea ended up making the latter decision, sending 1,000 and 3,000 troops respectively 
to the war-torn region, and while they had some incentive to direct more U.S. policy 
attention to the North Korea issue, it is certain that neither country had a serious desire to 
get involved.173 The risk of international entrapment is more salient now than in previous 
years, particularly with U.S. troops back in Iraq and ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, 
and Ukraine. Japan does not want to engage in these disputes, and will be wary of how 
loosely its collective self-defense measures are interpreted when assessing responsibility 
for international peacekeeping. 
Abandonment 
 While Japan may have concerns about entrapment, abandonment is a more 
persistent issue when it comes to the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Abandonment is the 
fear that “the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, or 
may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.”174 Also known 
as “de-coupling,” abandonment, which could happen if the U.S. deemed it more 
worthwhile to protect its own homeland and interests than Japan’s, is a prospect over 
which Japan has repeatedly expressed concern.175 
 There are two countries that Japan fears the most in regard to U.S. abandonment: 
China and North Korea. China and Japan have many ongoing historical and modern-day 
feuds, on everything from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to revising Japanese textbooks for 
historical atrocities to clashing nationalism on both sides. Because China has a slowly but 
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steadily growing nuclear arsenal, with long-range capacities and increasingly 
sophisticated delivery systems, Japan could be at risk of abandonment if the U.S. decides 
that in a confrontational situation with China, it is not worth the effort of threatening 
extended nuclear deterrence over Japan. 
 North Korea is more likely than China to push Japan into a position of 
abandonment. North Korean officials stated in 2013 that: “Japan is always in the cross-
hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will 
touch Japan first.”176 Lingering wartime and xenophobic resentment, combined with 
proxy aggression toward the U.S. through Japan, are the most convincing motivations 
behind this statement, though the degree to which each plays a role is a topic for another 
paper. Three risks for Japan from North Korea include: 1) further North Korean 
provocation by non-nuclear means; 2) escalation in tensions and threats in the case of a 
miscalculation from North Korean leaders; and 3) blatant aggression from North Korean 
nuclear weapons.177 After the attempts of the 1990s, normalization talks have not been 
renewed between the two countries, making non-violent solutions to dissolve tensions 
more difficult to implement. In spite of all U.S. assurances to the contrary, Japan still sees 
North Korea as a significant threat to its security, and thus naturally sees the potential for 
U.S. abandonment. 
 Both entrapment and abandonment are examples of Japan anticipating the failure 
of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Interestingly enough, failures of deterrence are not 
as uncommon as one might hope, and are dependent on any of the following three 
factors: a highly motivated weaker state, a weaker state misperceiving some facet of the 
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situation, and a stronger state with detected vulnerability.178 The next chapter will 
connect the concerns of the current alliance to the evolving nuclear posture in order to 
determine the best path toward a more comprehensive, stable security relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan. 
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VI. EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FULFILLMENT 
Keeping in mind the strategic evolution of U.S. nuclear posture, the original 
framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the challenges the alliance has faced over the past 
century, and the current circumstances of the bilateral nuclear relationship, this section of 
the paper now returns to its main two questions. First, how well has the current nuclear 
posture covered the security commitments established in the U.S.-Japan alliance up to 
this point? And second, how well will the changing nuclear posture fulfill alliance 
requirements in the future? 
For a straightforward answer to these questions, this paper asserts that while the 
U.S nuclear posture up to this point has been satisfactory enough to prevent panic and 
ensure protection of Japan, the evolving nuclear posture from this point onward will 
strengthen the credibility of existing security commitments, deter potential attackers, and 
give Japan the confidence to become a more coordinated partner in the relationship.  
Security attitudes, or a country’s views on the use and placement of military force 
and foreign intervention measures, have played and will continue to play a role in these 
evaluations of security commitments. In the aftermath of World War II, Japan was forced 
to retreat from its foreign exploits, and adopted the 1947 isolationist constitution that 
renounced all forms of war. It has always been very concerned about issues within the 
Asian region, and only mildly concerned about conflicts in other parts of the world. It has 
stuck firmly, with a few minor deviations, to its drive for peace and conflict resolution 
over violent encounters. While the pacifist attitude has mostly remained in both the 
Japanese public and the administration, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term has 
begun see some historic changes, with the 2014 shift to “Proactive Contribution to Peace” 
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and discussions of increased defense budgets. Meanwhile, the U.S. used to be focused on 
fighting Communism, not hesitating to antagonize countries from North Korea and 
Vietnam to the former Soviet Union, and coming up with aggressive strategies such as 
massive retaliation and flexible response in preparation for bombing these places with 
nuclear missiles. When the Cold War ended, it reduced its nuclear weapons arsenal, 
having lost its major enemy, and began to take a more cautious approach, using threats of 
conventional force in addition as a softer alternative to nuclear. Then the Obama 
Administration introduced the “Pivot to Asia” concept in 2011, stating that from a 
strategic standpoint: “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is 
increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or 
ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.”179 This is 
combined with the understanding that the U.S. is in the process of modernizing its 
nuclear arsenal, which is designed to more efficiently protect its national and 
international interests. The historical alliance was built on a bilateral relationship with 
very different perspectives on war and nuclear weapons, which made for a less credible 
nuclear deterrent and thus affected the credibility of the two countries’ security 
commitments both during and after the Cold War. However, in recent years there seems 
to have been an alignment of sorts due to a mutual focus on the Asian region, as well as 
increased willingness to engage with each other on nuclear issues. These parallel attitudes 
strengthen the security commitments of the bilateral alliance, and will continue to 
strengthen them as modernization progresses. 
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Additionally, the abrupt policy discrepancies or “surprises” between the two 
countries on nuclear weapons issues have also been influential in shaping the current U.S. 
nuclear posture for protecting Japan. Japan only considered nuclear weapons 
development in the late 1960s because of its concern that the U.S. nuclear arsenal would 
not deter a Chinese nuclear attack, especially with U.S. attention fixated on the Soviet 
Union. The 1970s Japanese policy of “U.S. Passing,” in response to the Nixon Doctrine, 
was made out of fear that the U.S. nuclear posture was too engaged with China, which 
could have negated the extended deterrence protection for Japan. And Japan’s hesitation 
to give logistical aid to the U.S. against North Korea in the 1990s was not only contingent 
on its pacifist constitution but also on its unease at the withdrawal of U.S forward 
deployed nuclear forces from South Korea in 1991. All of these examples illustrate that 
without aligned security attitudes and a mutual understanding of the priorities and 
structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Japan begins to question the credibility of U.S. 
security commitments and looks into other avenues for national defense. Fortunately, in 
the past few years there have been no major incidents of “surprises” from the Japanese in 
terms of nuclear security, signaling a positive trend in the development of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, even with an evolving nuclear posture. 
Given these improvements in the alliance up to now, how can the U.S. maintain 
its progress and effectively deter attacks on Japan, without making Japan feel that the 
security commitments are either too loose or too restrictive? Do we have any reason to be 
worried about the alliance as the nuclear posture changes? 
To deter attacks specifically on Japan, the U.S. needs to focus on how it portrays 
the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in its security negotiations with other states, especially 
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countries like China and Russia. If, in its haste to make friendlier relations with China, 
the U.S. gives too much of an impression that the U.S.-Japan alliance is irrelevant, it 
automatically detracts from the credibility and security of the relationship itself. On the 
physical arsenal side, since deterrence is about threatening second-strike capability, as 
opposed to defense, there is no need to surround Japan with nuclear weapons and hope 
for the best. However, as the modernization process is slowly implemented throughout 
the branches of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, adequate amounts of deployed forces need to be 
clearly displayed to any state who might think about sneaking in an attack. The word 
“adequate” when referring to the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is one of the most 
disputed terms in the business. Proponents of full triad revitalization argue that any other 
cuts to the nuclear deterrent is harmful to the U.S. arsenal as a whole; in the words of 
Peter Huessy, president of the consulting firm GeoStrategic Analysts, “Cutting the very 
backbone of our nuclear security is not the way forward to a safer world or safer 
America.”180 Others view the continuation of the triad as a detriment to international 
disarmament and the NPT, which will lead to more instability.181 No matter how the 
nuclear force ends up, as long as it gives the impression of being comprehensive and 
daunting, and the U.S. shows strong diplomatic support of the alliance when dealing with 
third parties, attacks toward Japan should be effectively deterred. 
The other part of this equation is the objective to keep Japan satisfied and 
confident in the bilateral relationship. It is crucial that the U.S. not attempt to shut down 
Abe’s efforts to reinterpret the constitution. Despite some alarmist reports, the prospect of 
a remilitarized Japan under Abe is far from reality. Brad Glosserman and David Kang 
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write in The National Interest that while Abe aims for Japan to have a new regional 
security role, there are many factors limiting the speed and scope of military 
expansion.182 These include public hostility toward extreme constitutional 
reinterpretations, a considerably restrictive defense budget, and high maintenance costs 
for existing personnel and equipment.183 Besides, Abe’s attempts to push for “Proactive 
Contribution to Peace” are in U.S. interests; after all, the tensions from the Nixon 
Doctrine were based on the U.S. assumption that Japan should take up a greater share of 
the alliance burden. As the countries work together for the Mutual Defense Guidelines 
and other cooperative measures, the U.S. should nurture the more active Japanese 
security policy while also being on the alert for moves that could push it too closely 
toward a stance resembling remilitarization. The other important point for the U.S. is to 
keep Japan informed through diplomatic, intelligence, and military channels, so that if the 
U.S. President makes a controversial policy statement about or related to nuclear security 
alliances, such as the Nixon Doctrine, it does not cause Japan to have a violent reaction. 
Military information-sharing might be the most important out of the three channels; if 
Japanese defense officials can visually verify and understand the U.S. nuclear posture and 
how it applies to extended deterrence, there might be less concern for the stability of the 
alliance. If the U.S. uses its hard and soft power wisely, it can establish an even stronger 
alliance with Japan than before. 
That being said, there are two major reasons to be concerned about the alliance as 
it aligns with the evolving U.S. nuclear posture. The first is if Japan escalates tensions 
with its Asian neighbors regarding the historical disputes mentioned in the previous 
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chapter. While the issues of the Yasukuni shrine, wartime comfort women, and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are all rooted in deep historical sensitivities, the one of most 
concern to the U.S. is the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial dispute. This is because if 
China decides to take more aggressive military measures to gain ownership of the islands, 
the U.S. will have to step in due to its commitment to protect any and all territories under 
the administration of Japan, a category under which the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
currently fall. 
 The second concern is if the modernization trajectory of the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
changes drastically without the U.S. briefing or consulting its allies. While the current 
official U.S. nuclear posture relies on a full nuclear triad, others have proposed several 
different iterations for the arsenal. Dana Johnson, Christopher Bowie, and Robert Haffa 
at the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies suggested in 2009 that the U.S. should shift 
to a dyad of SLBMs and ICBMs, phasing out the bomber leg of the triad.184 In the same 
year, Jeff Richardson at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory advocated that 
ICBMs should be the retiring leg of the triad, citing bombers and SLBMs as the more 
practical dyad.185 Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay of the Cato 
Institute took an even more extreme approach in 2013, claiming that SLBMs alone would 
be more than sufficient to cover the deterrent needs of the U.S. and its allies.186 It is not 
within the scope of this paper to discuss which arrangement is the most optimal. However, 
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if one of these models ends up convincing enough to sway the next U.S. presidential 
administration, there needs to be a very strong marketing campaign to the domestic 
sphere, as well as U.S. friends and foes, that the new arrangement will provide just as 
much deterrence capability as the original triad. Otherwise, the other nuclear weapons 
states see the move as weakness, Japan’s concerns are reignited, and the U.S. will have a 
decreased nuclear force with fewer deterrent options, combined with more international 
tensions, creating a more chaotic situation than when it started the modernization process. 
 Maintaining the positive trend of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship with regard 
to weapons will not be easy. It will take serious hard work on the part of both parties, and 
there are many factors to keep in consideration, both inside and outside of the alliance. In 
spite of this, it seems that ongoing developments will push the alliance toward an ever 
more trusting and responsible relationship. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, pushing the nuclear launch button is one of the least desired 
and most controversial policy moves in the world of international relations. It has not 
been approved to use against another country since 1945, yet U.S. alliances continue to 
promise extended nuclear deterrent capabilities under the assumption that if enemies try 
to attack, they will receive nuclear catastrophe in return. This paper has looked 
specifically at the U.S.-Japan relationship in the context of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in 
order to understand the dynamics of these types of alliances, specifically the deterrent 
strategies that influence foreign relations, the inherent concerns on both sides of the 
alliance, and what needs to be done for the future to simultaneously deter U.S. foes and 
reassure U.S. allies. 
However, the U.S. and Japan are not in a vacuum. Nuclear weapons-related 
diplomatic and military efforts with China, South Korea, and North Korea all have 
important influences on the U.S.-Japan alliance, and will remain key factors during the 
ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization. 
China-U.S. relations regarding nuclear weapons play an important role due to the 
fact that they are extremely limited. China seems to be sticking to its “lean and effective” 
nuclear posture, which aims to keep a small, manageable force that can both deter 
potential nuclear attacks and reduce the effectiveness of nuclear intimidation.187 This is 
promising for the U.S. and its allies, who are extremely concerned about a rising China, 
especially with its formidable economy and modernizing military. Nonetheless, China 
has also refused to engage in bilateral military-to-military discussions on nuclear 
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weapons with the U.S., dissuading attempts from both the George W. Bush and Obama 
Administrations. The U.S. would benefit from these talks in two major ways. First, they 
would allay U.S. concerns about the trajectory of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, so the U.S. 
could make better decisions about military investments and provide reassurance for its 
allies, namely Japan.188 Second, the U.S. would use the talks to understand Chinese 
concerns, so that it can avoid or minimize potentially controversial policies while also 
preventing Beijing from adopting a reactionary approach to its nuclear forces. Neither of 
these objectives, however, can be achieved without engaging China in some sort of 
dialogue, which it has rejected on multiple occasions. The lack of communication 
between the U.S. and China on nuclear weapons issues creates uncertainties and 
speculation, which in turn can lead to potentially dangerous policy misinterpretations, not 
only by the two nuclear powers but also by non-nuclear allies like Japan, which already 
have a list of concerns when it comes to China. The U.S. has to keep China in mind when 
crafting its modernization strategy, or else there could be serious tensions that push Japan 
into a threatened position, which threatens the bilateral alliance.  
Meanwhile, South Korea provides its own unique influence on the U.S.-Japan 
bilateral security relationship due to its rival status as another recipient of U.S. extended 
nuclear deterrence, as well as its controversial relations with Japan. In addition to 
competing for U.S. nuclear attention, South Korea and Japan are also competing in their 
own territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan. South 
Koreans have ongoing suspicions of Japan that prevent ample diplomatic progress; for 
example, in May and June 2012 a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement, which the U.S. 
hoped would improve trilateral coordination on security issues, fell through at the last 
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minute because South Korea withdrew its signature.189 Furthermore, South Korea, unlike 
Japan, views China as a valuable ally and partner rather than an “existential challenge 
and territorial threat,” particularly because it needs Chinese support when dealing with 
North Korea.190 These conflicting demands, perspectives, and priorities could be 
detrimental to the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance and nuclear weapons issues. The 
U.S. has to choose, for example on concerns related to China, whether to yield to 
Japanese fears or South Korean confidence; and no matter which one it selects, the 
unselected ally will automatically feel shunned, an unhelpful attitude for building trust in 
an alliance involving nuclear weapons. 
North Korea is the final piece of the East Asian regional puzzle. While it serves as 
“one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period,” North Korea also has the potential as the hostile state to bring allied 
countries together like no diplomatic summit ever could. Its provocations have actually 
led Japan and South Korea into some bilateral breakthroughs, as well as improved 
trilateral relations with the U.S., the Perry diplomatic process after the 1998 Taepodong 
launch being a perfect example.191 Both the U.S. and Japan want to maximize their 
relations with North Korea, despite the lack of diplomatic normalization between any of 
these countries. At the same time, Japan is painfully aware of the dangers from being so 
close in proximity to the North Korea’s budding nuclear program, and the U.S. is 
painfully aware of its commitment to deter North Korean nuclear attacks on Japan. How 
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North Korea acts over the upcoming years, then, will be yet another factor in determining 
the credibility and quality of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. 
China, South Korea, and North Korea each contribute their own special 
circumstances and interests to the extended nuclear deterrent relationship between the 
U.S. and Japan. So far, however, the bilateral alliance is looking strong. Increased U.S.-
Japanese communication efforts help to ease some of the regional tensions, and active 
security attitudes on both sides allow for more productive dialogue on crucial nuclear 
weapons issues, including nuclear modernization. As long as these positive developments 
are cultivated and expanded upon, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be a 
cornerstone of U.S. East Asia policy for many more years. 
 Nuclear weapons have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it. But with 
the right amount of good diplomacy, calculated military strategy, and common sense, the 
U.S. just might be able to use them to leverage a lasting peace. 
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